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Abstract
Many decisions of economic interest are taken by groups. How-
ever, comparatively little is known regarding how the decisions of
individuals are shaped when they are part of a group. In this thesis
I investigate, by means of economic experiments, three such cases.
First, I use a lab experiment to test how subjects choose whether to
acquire information and how they use that information when they
need to cast a vote regarding a group decision. My findings suggest
that the subjects see this environment as a game, not as a decision
making task, and they largely conform to theoretical predictions at
the aggregate level. However, I uncover large individual heterogene-
ity, which is partly explained by behavioural factors. Next, I turn my
attention to investigating what behavioural factors correlate with a
real, binary, voting decision. In order to do so I administer a battery
of validated experimental tests. I find that one decision is associ-
ated with fewer correct answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test,
suggesting that these subjects are more impulsive. I find no evi-
dence that risk/loss aversion or distributional preferences correlate
with either decision. This finding indicates that within my sample
the decision is likely driven by the subjects impulsive tendencies, not
underlying preferences. Finally, I use a natural variation in crops
cultivation to show that a norm has been created and transmitted
intergenerationally in one group but not another of otherwise identi-
cal people. I argue that the attitude towards punishment, not social
preferences or expectations, is the main channel through which the
norm is propagated. I link my experimental results to current be-
haviour regarding contributions to public goods and volunteering to
show that my results have external validity.
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A tale of two dimensions: Voting with endogenouns in-
formation acquisition in the lab
Theodoros Alysandratos
Royal Holloway, University of London
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Abstract
We report on an voting experiment with two dimensional pref-
erences and endogenous information acquisition. Our subjects were
asked to pick one out of two colours. One of the colours was the state
of the world and the group was paid only if they guessed it correctly.
Departing from the existing literature, the values of the two colours
to each subject are not equal to each other. Our model suggests the
existence of several uninformed voters and that information acquisi-
tion depends positively on the values attributed to each colour. Our
results at the aggregate level confirm our theoretical predictions. In
addition, we find that loss aversion is a strong predictor of both
information acquisition and abstention choices. At the individual
level we uncover large and persistent heterogeneity. Our subjects
keep on making the same mistakes over time and exhibit no signs of
learnings. We also find that they tend to vote more often if they in
the past received signals that matched the state of the world. We
interpret that as a possible sign of overconfidence. Finally, we show
that there is no learning and that political polarisation increases the
propensity to vote.
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Part I
A tale of two dimensions: Voting with
endogenouns information acquisition in
the lab
1 Introduction
There is a growing literature in experimental political economy that studies
voting decisions in the laboratory. In the present study we wish to examine
empirically the relationship between the preferences of the voters and their
decisions to buy information and to vote. We base our experiment on the
framework developped by Oliveros (2013). This model allows us to examine
the relationship of the relative intensity of preferences with the aforemen-
tioned decisions. In addition, we examine the effect of polarisation. How
will the electorate change its behaviour in the presence of biased voters who
are never informed but always vote? Subjects in our experiment become
informed only when their relative preferences over the two alternatives are
sufficiently close. If they become informed, they vote according to their
signal. However, a large portion chooses to stay uninformed. Most of the
uninformed subjects vote, although a non-negligible minority abstains. The
presence of biased voters causes some subjects to change their behaviour,
but it doesn’t substantially affect the aggregte amount of information in
the electorate. However, we uncover large individual heterogeneity and we
show that loss aversion has substantial explanatory power. Overall our
results show that if polarisation is manifested as an increase in the pref-
erence of one alternative over the other, voters might be more likely to
vote. However, the aggregate information in the electorate will probably
decrease. If on the other hand polarisation is manifested as an increase
in the perception of the proportion of uninformed voters, aggregate infor-
mation and the percentage of the electorate that votes will not change.
Finally, our results show that loss aversion might be an important param-
eter that explains information acquisition and needs to be explored further.
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To be more precise: a committee of three has to guess the correct state of
the world. One member of the committee is a preprogrammed player fol-
lowing a publicly known strategy. The other two members have the option
to buy an imperfectly informative signal before choosing for which colour to
vote or whether to abstain. We call models where each voter earns the same
reward from every state of the world, as long as her group guesses correctly,
unidimensional. In contrast our model has two dimensions, voters may earn
different rewards from each guessing correctly, depending on which one the
state of the world. In this framework we show that behaviour may dif-
fer substantially. More precisely, we predict near-zero levels of abstention
and very high levels of uninformed voting, whereas a unidimensional model
would predict high levels of abstention and low levels of uninformed voting.
We experimentally test those predictions in the lab and come up with the
following results. The fundamental insights of the model find strong em-
pirical support. The subjects remain uninformed when they should not
buy the signal. When they vote, they mostly act as the theory predicts
conditional on their informational status. We also uncover two regularities
that deviate from the theoretical predictions. First, our experimental sub-
jects invested less that expected in information acquisition. Our regressions
indicate that loss aversion is a strong predictor of the failure to buy the
signal. Second, we observe non-zero, non-trivial abstention rates among
the uninformed subjects. Our analysis shows that abstention is increased
when political polarisation is lower. Loss aversion also increases absten-
tion. Having observed a signal that matched the state of the world in a
previous round decreases the probability of abstention, perhaps indicating
an overconfidence effect. Empirical support for the strict predictions of the
model with respect to both information acquisition and voting behaviour
is not equally strong.
In our design each committee consists of three voters. The committee
needs to guess the correct state of the world using simple majority. Two
of the members are human subjects who have private, i.i.d. preferences
over the two colours, green and yellow. Before casting their vote, or decid-
14
ing to abstain, human subjects can buy a costly, imperfectly informative,
private signal regarding the state of the world. The third player is a prepro-
grammed, computerised player with a publicly known, predefined strategy.
We administered two treatments varying the strategy of the biased player.
In the first treatment (unbiased) the preprogrammed player randomises
with equal probability between the two options. In the second treatment
(biased) she always votes for yellow. We chose these treatments to study
whether the presence of an extremely biased decision maker would alter the
behaviour of the subjects. Our simulations predict the presence of an al-
ternative equilibrium with abstention in the second treatment. The added
benefit of the biased treatment is that it provides a strategically simpler
environment. We find no differences between the two treatments with re-
spect to either signal purchasing or voting behaviour. Nor we uncover any
evidence that shows the subjects tried to play the alternative equilibrium
with abstention.
The present study builds upon three strands of the literature in experi-
mental political economy. Goeree and Yariv (2011) use an experiment to
study the effects of communication and decision making thresholds (ma-
jority, two-thirds majority and unanimity) in committee voting. Mattozzi
and Nakaguma (2016) examine the effect of public vs secret voting on the
the decision of the group and show. Both these papers have voters with
different preferences over the alternatives. Our model differs from theirs
in the sense that we are not interested in the institutional environment,
but we focus on the decision to acquire information, the use of informa-
tion in the voting stage and the effect of the biased voter in the outcome.
Bhattacharya et al. (2014) study the effect of abstention versus compulsory
voting.Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) vary the size of the group, the decision
rule and the communication of the group to study the decision of a jury.
They find limited support for the theoretical model of Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1996). Finally, Bouton et al. (2017) create experimental groups
to study the effect of various forms of the unanimity rule with respect to in-
formation aggregation and group welfare. Our study deviates substantially
from the latter three papers in that they induce homogeneous preferences.
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The seminal theoretical work on voting with asymmetric information is
by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). In that they develop a unidimen-
sional model of voting with exogenous information acquisition. Battaglini
et al. (2010) tested that model in the laboratory. In their experiments they
found strong theoretical support for the model of Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer (1996) when they examine the experimental data at the aggregate level.
In their experiment subjects who are uninformed abstain when the pre-
programmed player is unbiased and those who are informed always vote
sincerely, according to the suggestion of the signal. The behaviour of the
preprogrammed player forces subjects to vote while being uninformed to
level the playing field. Other papers that have studied committees with
exogenous information acquisition are Herrera et al. (2016), Morton and
Tyran (2011) and Mengel and Rivas (2017). The aforementioned three pa-
pers find that uninformed voters sometimes vote and sometimes abstain,
wherever that is allowed. Mengel and Rivas (2017) in particular observe
subjects voting against their private signals. This behaviour is practically
non-existent in our experiment.
Finally, the last strand of the literature that relates to our experiment
is the one that studies endogenous informaton acquisition. Grosser and
Seebauer (2016) build a unidimensional model of voting with endogenous
information acquisition, while varying the size of their committees. They
find uninformed voting which they explain with QRE. In our experiment
we find that the problem of cursed voting may be even more pronounced
when multi-dimensional preferences are introduced. Bhattacharya et al.
(2017) develop a similar model, without allowing for abstention. In line
with our results they observe overinvestment in costly information acquisi-
tion in large groups and underinvestment in small ones. Other studies that
relate to ours are those by Elbittar et al. (ming) and Morton et al. (2013).
Our study adds to the literature in two ways: first, we combine endoge-
nous information acquisition with heterogeneous preferences. Second, we
introduce the preprogrammed player who allows us to study the effect of
preferences polarisation in the electorate.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The theoretical set up is
presented in section 2. The experimental design is described in section 3.
Our main results are presented in section 10. We present more analysis
on learning in section 5. Section 11 summarises the findings and concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The set up
In each voting group there are three voters. The group needs to choose
between two colours, green and yellow. The goal for the group is to pick
the colour that has been drawn by nature to be the state of the world.
Each colour is ex ante equally likely to be chosen by nature. The group
decision is determined using a simple plurality rule. In case of a tie, a fair
coin is tossed to determine the collective choice.
One of the voters is a partisan who follows a predetermined and publicly
known strategy. In the unbiased treatment the partisan randomises with
equal probability between voting for yellow and voting for green. In the
biased treatment she always votes for yellow. In the experiment the parti-
san voter is represented by a computerised player. In the experiment the
partisan voter is played by the computer. We chose this design for two rea-
sons. First, a preprogrammed player is guaranteed to follow the strategy
we expect her to play. Since we do not want to study whether the subjects
guess what is the optimal strategy for the partisan voter, having a human
play that role would introduce unnecessary noise. The second reason for
this choice is practical: a preprogrammed player allows us to collect more
observations from human subjects in the condition of interest.
The non-partisan voters have to choose from a set of three actions: {G, Y,A},
where G is vote for green, Y is vote for yellow and A is abstain. Each
non-partisan voter earns a private value if the group decision matches the
state of the world. Those private values are defined as: V = {VY , VG} ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 100}2. Each private value is independently and identically drawn
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from a uniform distribution. If the group picks yellow (green) and yellow
(green) is the state of the world, each non-partisan voter will earn her pri-
vate VY (VG). If the group’s choice does not match the state of the world,
the non-partisan voters earn zero. Please note that the earnings of each
non-partisan voter depend on the group choice, her own choice is relevant
only in so far as it influences the group choice.
The non-partisan voters can buy an informative signal S ∈ {SY , SG} re-
garding the state of the world. SY (SG) means that the signal advises the
voter to pick Yellow (Green). The signal costs ten points and its precision
is eighty percent; that is the signal matches the state of the world with an
eighty percent probability. The precision of the signal is unaffected by the
state of the world. Each signal is private and ex ante uncorrelated with
the signals that other non-partisans may receive. The distribution from
which the private values are drawn, the strategy of the partisan voter, the
precision and the cost of the signal are common knowledge.
The timing of the game is as follows: 1) Nature draws a colour to be the
state of the world. 2) Each non-partisan voter becomes informed about her
own private values. 3) The non-partisan voters decide whether to buy the
signal. 4) The private signals are revealed to those who bought them. 5)
All voters, partisans and non-partisans alike, cast their votes. 6) The votes
are counted and the colour with the most votes is the group choice.
The pure strategy of each non-partisan consists of two decisions: 1) whether
to buy the signal or not I i : {1, . . . , 100}2 → {1
2
, 0.8} and 2) what action
to choose in the voting stage V i : {1, . . . , 100}2×{SY , SG, S} → {G, Y,A}.
2.2 Equilibria
We focus our attention to pure strategies and symmetric, bayesian equi-
libria. The intuition for the strategies played is the following: Each non-
partisan voter has to decide whether to buy the signal or not and how to
act upon receiving it or without it. Given that the strategy of the partisan
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voter is public knowledge, a non-partisan only needs to consider what the
other non-partisan is going to vote in order to determine her own strategy.
In other words she has to take into account what the other non-partisan
is going to do for every pair of VY and VG values the other non-partisan
has. Clearly this is a very demanding calculation. Fortunately, it can be
reduced to a simpler one: consider what a non-partisan with a random pair
of values will do. Since we are focusing on symmetric equilibria, this line of
thought implies that in order to find an equilibrium, it is enough to ensure
that both partisans have the same probability of choosing each strategy.
Each voter has to consider the expected payoff of twelve strategies:
1. Vote yellow and remain uninformed:
2. Vote green and remain uninformed:
3. Abstain and remain uninformed:
4. Become informed and always vote yellow:
5. Become informed and vote yellow if the signal is yellow, else abstain:
6. Become informed and always vote green:
7. Become informed and vote green if the signal is green, else abstain:
8. Become informed and always vote as the signal suggests:
9. Become informed and always vote against the signal’s suggestion:
10. Become informed and always abstain:
11. Become informed and vote green if the signal is yellow, else abstain:
12. Become informed and vote yellow if the signal is green, else abstain:
It is easy to see that some of those strategies are dominated. For example,
it never makes sense to buy the signal if the subject intends to abstain
upon receiving it or to vote against the signal. After eliminating the dom-
inated strategies, we are left with strategies (1)-(3), (5) and (7)-(8), to
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consider. Following Oliveros (2013) we find the equilibrium in the space
of probabilities. That is for every pair of values and a belief regarding the
strategy of the other player, we calculate the optimal strategy for player i.
The equilibrium is when the probability that player i chooses strategy j is
equal to the probability that player −i chooses strategy j. In other words,
at the equilibrium both players should have the same probability of voting
yellow and remaining uniformed, voting green and remaining uninformed,
etc. In order to compute the equilibrium we use computer simulations. It
is important to note that it is possible there are other symmetric equilibria
that our simulations have failed to uncover. In fact Oliveros (2013) states
that equilibrium multiplicity is to be expected in this game.
Result 1 At the equilibrium there are three main1 types of behaviour: Vote
yellow without being informed, vote green without being informed and be-
come informed and vote as the signal suggests.
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp. Suppose that one’s values
for yellow and green are 75 and 10 respectively. If that voter bought the
signal, her new values, after deducting the cost of buying the signal, would
be 65 and 0. In a situation like this, there is no benefit from voting green.
Even if it turns out to be the correct state of the world, the voter will earn
nothing. She is better off voting for yellow, even if the probability of that
being correct is a lot smaller. If the voter knows that she will be better off
not using the information of the signal, she is not going to buy it in the
first place and she will vote for the more preferred colour, in this case for
yellow. Assume now that one’s values for yellow and green are 90 and 70
respectively. If she buys the signal, her values are going to be 80 and 60
respectively. However, in this case the difference between the two values
and the level of the accuracy of the signal are such that the voter is better
off voting for the colour indicated by the signal.
1In both treatments in less than 1% of the potential pairs of values it is an equilibrium
to always abstain. In the biased treatment it is an equilibrium in less than 1% of the
potential pairs of values to vote green if the signal suggests it and abstain otherwise.
Due to their very minor importance we do not discuss further the implications of those
propositions.
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Result 2 The presence of the biased partisan will cause those subjects for
which V G > V Y to become more informed relative to the treatment with
the unbiased partisan.
Result 3 The presence of the biased partisan will cause those subjects for
which V G < V Y to become less informed relative to the treatment with the
unbiased partisan.
The reaction to the presence of the biased partisan is not symmetric. Those
who are favoured by the partisan are more inclined to either vote without
acquiring information. If the signal suggests to them to vote for green,
there is always one vote in favour of yellow in the ballot. Hence, the ex-
pected earnings from buying the signal are diminished and not buying it
becomes more attractive. In the same vein, those who favour green are
now in greater need to acquire more information.
Result 4 About two thirds of the voters in both treatments will be unin-
formed.
The last result emphasises that due to the asymmetric effect of the bi-
ased partisan. While some voters will be less motivated to buy the signal,
others will be more motivated. The aggregate effect will be nearly identical.
The computational predictions for the biased treatment are visualised in
figure 2. Similarly, the computational predictions for the unbiased treat-
ment are visualised in the figure 8.
3 Experimental design
The experiment took place at the laboratory of Royal Holloway, University
of London in May 2015 and it was run on z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
subjects were recruited from the graduate and undergraduate student pool
of Royal Holloway using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total 68 subjects took
part in five sessions. Each session lasted about 75 minutes and subjects
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Figure 1: Map of equilibrium behaviour in the unbiased treatment when
the other voter is informed.
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Figure 2: Map of equilibrium behaviour in the biased treatment when the
other voter is informed.
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Table 1: The order of the treatments and the number of subjects that
participated in each of them
Session Order Subjects
1 Unbiased-Biased 12
2 Unbiased-Biased 16
3 Biased-Unbiased 20
4 Biased-Unbiased 12
5 Unbiased-Biased 8
got paid for the total number of points accumulated during the experiment.
The average compensation, inclusive of a £4 show up fee, was £11.2. We
used a within subject design, varying the order of the two treatments to
mitigate any order effects. Each treatment lasted for 30 rounds.
The subjects were greeted by the experimenter and detailed instructions
were handed out to them. Sufficient time was given to allow the subjects
to read the instructions. A questionnaire had to be answered by all the
subjects before anyone was allowed to proceed to the next stage. The ex-
perimenter also read the instructions aloud to ensure common knowledge of
the rules. The wording of the instructions was deliberately kept politically
neutral. There was no mention of casting a vote or political candidates so
as not to invoke norms with respect to voting. There was no communica-
tion among the subjects during the treatments.
During the game the subjects were matched in groups of two in addition to
the preprogrammed player, who was computerised, forming a committee
of three members. If the group’s guess did not match the correct colour,
they would earn zero if they had not bought the signal or they would lose
ten points if they had. It becomes evident that the subjects could make
losses in any given round. This was chosen specifically to instil a sense of
real cost regarding information acquisition. Despite that, the cost was kept
sufficiently low that no subject could leave the lab without making some
positive gains, even in the unlikely event that she made a loss in every
single round.
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Figure 3: The screen of the subjects in stage 1
In the first stage subjects were shown their private set of values for each
outcome. They were also asked whether they wanted to buy the signal.
The screen contained a reminder of the cost and the accuracy of the sig-
nal. Figure 3 shows the screen the subjects saw at stage 1. Feedback was
limited to their own actions in that round, the guess of the group, the true
state of the world and the amount of points they earned. We restricted
the amount of feedback given to the subjects to prevent, as much as pos-
sible, the creation of behavioural norms regarding voting and information
acquisition. More precisely, we were concerned that subjects would feel
compelled to buy the signal or vote if they knew others did that as well.
Similarly we were worried that subjects may punish potential free riders
by not buying the signal even if their set of values was sufficiently high to
make such a choice non-optimal. Answers to the questionnaire at the end
of the experiment point to the direction that the influence of these factors
was in fact minimised.
In stage two the subjects were shown the signal, if they had bought it,
and were asked to decide whether they would vote in favour of a colour or
abstain. Figure 4 shows the screen of the subjects at that stage. Finally,
the subjects were given feedback, with the intentional limitations described
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Figure 4: The screen of the subjects in stage 2
above. Figure 5 presents the screen that was used to convey feedback to
the subjects.
4 Results
4.1 The decision to acquire information
First, we examine the results at an aggregate level. Our aim is to determine
whether the descriptive statistics are in agreement with our theoretical
predictions. Figure 6 presents the scatter plot of the decisions made by
the subject in the first stage. As it is already evident from the plots, the
subjects were largely in line with the theoretical predictions. The mistakes
made by those who bought the informative signal while they should not,
were close to the border regions. On the other hand, is it more difficult
to find a pattern regarding the subjects who should buy the signal but did
not based on their values from choosing yellow or green. As can be seen in
table 2 83% of the subjects who were expected to not buy the signal, did
not buy it. On the contrary, the subjects who were expected to buy the
signal, only did so about half the time.
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Figure 5: The screen of the subjects in stage 3
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Figure 6: Scatterplot with the decisions of the subjects in the first stage
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Table 2: Table of information acquisition decisions made by treatment
Unbiased Treatment Biased Treatment
Prediction Bought Did not buy Bought Did not buy
Buy 48% 52% 45% 55%
Do not buy 17% 83% 17% 83%
Experimental Result 1 Subjects are more likely to buy the signal as
their Yellow and Green values increase.
Evidence for this result can be seen in table 3. The variables Green Value
and Yellow Value correspond to the subjects’ Green and Yellow values
respectively. Difference is the difference between these two values. Loss
Aversion is a binary variable indicating whether the subjects is classified
as loss averse or not. Unbiased Treatment is a dummy for the treatment.
Total Correct Signals is a variable showing how many times the subjects
saw a signal that suggested an action matching the state of the world.
The remaining variables are interaction terms between the aforementioned
variables, intending to show whether there are differential responses with
respect to treatments or colors. The first two columns report results from
simple OLS regressions. In column (1) the signs for both colour values are
positive and statistically significant. The effect suggests that a one unit
increase in Green Value increases the probability of buying the signal by
0.4%. The size effect for the Yellow Value is qualitatively similar. Yet, the
two coefficients are statistically different from each other (Wald-test for
equality of coefficients, p-value=0.013). In column (2) the sign of Green
Value is again positive and statistically significant. More importantly, the
Difference variable is statistically significant and positive. The size of the
the effect indicates that for a one unit increase in the difference between
the two values, the probability of buying the signal increases by 0.4%. This
regression indicates that subjects react positively to an increase of the dif-
ference when it is due to an increase of the Green Value and negatively
when it is due to an increase of the Yellow Value. Column (3) adds pe-
riod to the list of independent variables in order to see how the decision
evolves over time. Our subjects were less likely to buy the signal as time
progressed. As we will see later this is unlikely to be due to learning. Col-
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umn (4) presents the results of a logit regression that verifies the results of
the OLS regressions. Further fixed and random effect regressions, as well
as OLS and Logit regressions with clustered standard errors at the session
level, that are not reported here, all confirm that the subjects’ decision
whether to buy or not the signal depends on their values in a way that
makes theoretical and intuitive sense.
Table 3: Regressions regarding the decision to acquire information
Dependent variable:
Bought Signal (Yes=1)
OLS Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Green Value 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.030
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Yellow Value 0.003 0.023
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Difference 0.004 0.004
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Loss Aversion −0.053 −0.054 −0.027 −0.361
p = 0.00002∗∗∗ p = 0.00001∗∗∗ p = 0.019∗∗ p = 0.00002∗∗∗
Unbiased Treatment 0.005 0.024 0.018 0.072
p = 0.855 p = 0.040∗∗ p = 0.106 p = 0.790
Total Correct Signals 0.021 0.020 0.029 0.125
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Yellow Value*Unbiased 0.001 0.003
p = 0.127 p = 0.267
Green Value*Unbiased −0.0002 −0.002
p = 0.630 p = 0.578
Green Value*Difference 0.00003 0.00003
p = 0.00001∗∗∗ p = 0.00001∗∗∗
Yellow Value*Difference −0.00004 −0.00004
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Period −0.008
p = 0.000∗∗∗
Constant −0.219 −0.172 0.012 −4.711
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.546 p = 0.000∗∗∗
Observations 4,080 4,080 test 4,080
R2 0.277 0.298 test
Note:Robust standard errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Experimental Result 2 Subjects are more likely to buy the signal the
more times they experience a signal suggesting the correct state of the world.
29
Evidence for this result is given in table 3. In all our regressions the sign of
the variable Total Correct Signals is positive and statistically significant.
The OLS regressions suggest that an one correct signal increases the prob-
ability of buying a signal in the future by approximately 2%. This finding
indicates that even though our subjects largely conform to the theoretical
predictions, they are not immune to behavioural effects. Subjects that have
had positive experiences from buying the signal, are more likely to buy it
again. This result may help to explain the fall in the consumption patterns
of news among countries. In a country where the media have proven to
be more accurate lately, voters may be more eager to consume information
from them. If, however, the media turn out to be less accurate, even if
that inaccuracy is to be occasionally expected, they may be permanently
discredited and the voters may turn to other sources.
Experimental Result 3 Subjects are less likely to buy the signal if they
are classified as loss averse.
At the end of the experiment the following question was posed to the sub-
jects: Assume that someone makes you the following offer: ”She will flip
a coin. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 4 pounds; if the coin
turns up tails, you win 6 pounds. Would you accept or reject the offer?”.
The question is taken from Gaechter et al. (2007) and was part of a ques-
tionnaire that has been shown to measure loss aversion. The argument in
Gaechter et al. (2007) is that subjects would need to have implausibly high
risk aversion coefficients to justify declining the wager, therefore it must
be loss aversion. We chose only one question in order to maximise the
chance of receiving meaningful answers, at the expense of a more refined
measure. The subjects who answered they would not accept the bet were
classified as loss averse. Our regressions in all columns show a large and
statistically significant negative effect of loss aversion on the probability
of buying the signal. The size of the effect is more than ten times bigger
than that of the value of the colours or of the difference of the values.
This result, and especially its magnitude, shows that behavioural factors,
such as loss aversion, cannot be ignored by either theorists or policy makers.
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4.2 The decision to vote
We now turn our attention to the decision to vote. Table 4 shows how the
subjects behaved on aggregate conditional on the information they had. In
both treatments informed subjects followed their signal about 95% of the
time. We take this percentage as a sign that the subjects understood the
game. Given that the signal has an 80% probability of being correct, if one
has invested in it, it only makes sense to follow it. The voting decisions of
the uninformed subjects are more interesting. About two thirds of them
voted for the colour with the highest value. This behaviour is, again, in
line with the theory and shows the existence of uninformed voters. Since
the decision regarding which colour to vote is clearly driven by either the
signal, for the informed subjects, or the colour with the higher value, for
the uninformed ones, we focus our investigation to the drivers of absten-
tion. As in the previous subsection, we report results from OLS and Logit
regressions with robust standard errors, but fixed and random panel re-
gressions with errors clustered at the session level yield similar results.
Table 4: Table of voting decisions made by treatment
Unbiased Treatment
Informed Uninformed
Followed the signal 95% Colour with highest value 63%
Against the signal 3.4% Opposite colour 13.5%
Abstained 1.6% Abstained 23.5%
Biased Treatment
Informed Uninformed
Followed the signal 94% Colour with highest value 68.4%
Against the signal 3.3% Opposite colour 13.2%
Abstained 2.7% Abstained 18.4%
Experimental Result 4 Subjects are less likely to abstain the higher their
Green and Yellow values are.
The evidence for this result is provided in table 5. Abstention is a binary
variable that takes value 1 if the subject abstained and 0 otherwise. Bought
Signal is also a binary variable, that shows whether the subject bought the
signal in the previous stage (1) or not (0). The remaining variables in the
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Table 5: Regressions regarding abstention decisions
Dependent variable:
Abstention
OLS Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Green Value −0.001 −0.001 −0.005
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Yellow Value −0.001 −0.004
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Difference −0.001
p = 0.000∗∗∗
Loss Aversion 0.047 0.047 0.426
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Unbiased Treatment 0.015 0.003 0.099
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.0004∗∗∗
Total Correct Signals −0.003 −0.003 −0.036
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Bought Signal −0.123 −0.123 −1.976
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Yellow Value*Unbiased −0.0002 −0.001
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.00000∗∗∗
Green Value*Unbiased −0.0001 −0.0005
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.070∗
Difference*Unbiased −0.0001
p = 0.000∗∗∗
Constant 0.223 0.229 −1.148
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Observations 4,080 4,080 4,080
R2 0.058 0.058
Note:Robust standard errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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regressions are the same as in the preceding analysis. The signs for the
Green and Yellow Value variables are negative and highly statistically sig-
nificant. In column (2) the sign of the variable Difference is also negative
and highly statistically significant.
Experimental Result 5 The presence of a biased voter makes abstention
less likely.
The sign of the Unbiased Treatment variable is positive and highly statisti-
cally significant. However, the interaction terms that involve the Unbiased
Treatment are negative and also highly statistically significant. We take
this finding to mean that increased polarisation in an election, as is the
case in the biased treatment, increases the propensity of the electorate to
vote. However, the sensitivity of the voting decision to the value of the
colours is diminished in the presence of polarisation.
Experimental Result 6 Loss averse subjects are more likely to abstain.
Table 5 shows that the sign of Loss Aversion is positive and highly statisti-
cally significant. Furthermore, the size of the effect due to loss aversion is
an order of magnitude larger than that due to the magnitude of the values
of the colours and at least three times larger than that of the Unbiased
treatment. We interpret this to mean that the subjects still perceive the
voting decision as bet involving a loss and avoid taking it.
Experimental Result 7 Subjects are less likely to abstain the more times
they experience a signal suggesting the correct state of the world.
This result is supported by the coefficients of the variable Total Correct
Signals. These are all estimated to be negative and highly statistically
significant. We interpret this to mean that our subjects develop a sort of
overconfidence as they accumulate positive experiences.
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5 Learning and decision making
There are a few more points that are worth investigating. Fist, it has been
suggested in the literature by Matsusaka (1995) that voters may not per-
ceive elections as a game but, rather, as a decision making task. In our
framework it is simple to investigate this supposition. We assume that
in such a case the subjects would ignore the presence of the other human
player, but not the strategy of the preprogrammed player. This assumption
makes sense since the preprogrammed player’s strategy is publicly known.
Then, we calculate the optimal actions computationally, in the same way
that we calculated the equilibrium previously. Figures 7 and 9 show that
if this situation was perceived as a decision making task, the number of
subjects who would buy the signal would have been a lot higher. Given
that the comparative statics only match very remotely and that we already
observe lower signal purchasing rates than predicted, we conclude that the
subjects perceived the experiment as a game and not as a decision making
task.
With regard to learning, first let us look at figure 9. We define two types
of errors: acquiring the signal when it is not optimal to do so (positive
error) and not acquiring the signal when it is optimal to do so (negative
error). In figure 9 we observe that the subjects seem to keep on making
the same kind of mistake. They other start by making positive or negative
errors and continue on the same path throughout the experiment. There
appears to be no learning. The increasing lines indicate that the subjects
keep on buying the signal while they should not. The decreasing lines in-
dicate that the subjects keep on not buying the signal while they should.
In other words, it shows that while on aggregate the observed behaviour
matches the theoretical predictions closely, at the individual level there is
large heterogeneity.
Experimental Result 8 There is no learning in our experiment.
This statement is supported by the results in table 6. The dependent vari-
able is Error, a binary variable indicating whether an error was committed
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Figure 7: Map of equilibrium behaviour in the unbiased treatment in deci-
sion making.
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(1) or not (0). The coefficient of the control variable Period is not statisti-
cally significant. We take this to mean that the propensity to commit an
error does not change as the subjects became more acquainted with the
experiment. In our design feedback was intentionaly restricted mostly to
one’s own decisions and the outcomes that affected the whole group. We
did that in order to minimise the chance of norms created within the ex-
periment, retaliation and other behavioural effects to affect our findings.
It is possible, however, that by not giving our subjects feedback on what
the other subjects did, we also restricted their ability to learn from the
mistakes of others.
6 Conclusions
We have developped an experiment to test how two-dimensional prefer-
ences affect endogenous information acquisition and voting decisions in the
laboratory. Our subjects were asked to pick one out of two colours. One
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Figure 8: Map of equilibrium behaviour in the biased treatment in decision
making.
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Figure 9: Cumulative errors by session.
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Table 6: Regressions regarding learning.
Dependent variable:
Error
OLS logistic
(1) (2) (3)
Green Value 0.005 0.007 0.025
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Yellow Value 0.002 0.013
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.000∗∗∗
Difference 0.002
p = 0.000∗∗∗
Period −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.001
p = 0.552 p = 0.552 p = 0.556
Bought Signal 0.039 0.039 0.174
p = 0.097∗ p = 0.097∗ p = 0.136
Unbiased 0.008 0.008 0.014
p = 0.765 p = 0.765 p = 0.948
Loss Aversion −0.031 −0.031 −0.179
p = 0.022∗∗ p = 0.022∗∗ p = 0.017∗∗
Total Correct Signals −0.001 −0.001 −0.005
p = 0.369 p = 0.369 p = 0.425
Yellow Value*Unbiased 0.001 0.005
p = 0.059∗ p = 0.060∗
Difference*Unbiased 0.001
p = 0.059∗
Green Value*Unbiased −0.002 −0.001 −0.007
p = 0.0005∗∗∗ p = 0.246 p = 0.003∗∗∗
Constant −0.019 −0.019 −2.658
p = 0.456 p = 0.456 p = 0.000∗∗∗
Observations 4,080 4,080 4,080
R2 0.110 0.110
Note:Robust standard errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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of the colours was the state of the world in each round. Departing from
the existing literature, the values of the two colours to each subject are
not equal to each other. Our model suggests the existence of several unin-
formed voters and that information acquisition depends positively on the
values attributed to each colour.
Our results at the aggregate level confirm our theoretical predictions. In
addition, we find that loss aversion is a strong predictor of both informa-
tion acquisition and abstention choices. At the individual level we uncover
large and persistent heterogeneity. Our subjects keep on making the same
mistakes over time and exhibit no signs of learnings. We also find that they
tend to vote more often if they in the past received signals that matched the
state of the world. We interpret that as a possible sign of overconfidence.
We are able to show that the decision making view of the task is not a
good match for the observed behaviour. Finally, we show that there is no
learning and that political polarisation increases the propensity to vote.
Our findings show that behavioural factors, such as loss aversion and over-
confidence brought about by previous positive or negative experiences tend
to affect voting and information acquisition decisions. These factors in
conjuction with individual heterogeneity need to be taken into account by
policy makers when considering how to induce the electorate to become
more informed or to vote. Similarly, theoretical models should incorporate
these effects in order to more accurately match actual behaviour. Further
theoretical and empirical investigation is warranted so as to investigate the
interplay of behavioural parameters, such as loss aversion and the game
theoretic set up.
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Abstract
In the past few decades psychologists and behavioural economists
have established that decision makers are boundedly rational. In this
paper we investigate whether the proneness of individuals to cogni-
tive biases correlates with actual voting decisions. We administer
a battery of established tests in experimental economics measuring
risk/loss/ambiguity aversion, depth of reasoning, ability to conduct
backwards induction and cognitive reflection. We use the voting de-
cisions in the Greek referendum of 2015 as a convenient test case, as
it was a binary choice (Yes or No). We find that ”No” voters score
significantly lower in the CRT, suggesting they have a lower ability to
suppress a spontaneous answer and use System 2 to reason. We also
find evidence that ”No” voters are strategically myopic, meaning
that they fail to grasp the importance of future rounds in sequen-
tial move games. On the other hand we find no differences in the
distributions of levels in a level-K game. We find no statistical evi-
dence that our subjects differ in their ability to conduct backwards
induction, their depth of reasoning, risk/loss aversion and their dis-
tributional preferences. These findigns indicate that our subjects
have similar preferences in any dimension that we measured. It is
therefore likely that their differences in their voting choices was the
outcome of higher use of system I cognitive processes, rather than
the outcome of different underlying preferences.
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Part II
Behavioural underpinnings of the
voting decision in the Greek
referendum
7 Introduction
Recent referendums in Scotland, Greece and the UK as a whole, whose
emergence and consequences have generated a long and intense public de-
bate and are highly relevant to inform policy decisions worldwide, offer
illustrative examples. In Scotland voters were asked to decide over inde-
pendence from Great Britain while, in Greece, over external coordination
with other European Union members on the country’s fiscal policy and
debt. Similarly, in Catalonia, a Spanish region, a coalition of parties run-
ning in federal government elections bundled independence from Spain to
their elections manifesto, thus implicitly inducing voters to jointly decide
over the regional government as well over independence. A referendum on
Britain’s place in the European Union took place in July 2016. Finally, in
the United States, the presidency will be essentially awarded through what
amounts to a referendum, between starkly different choices.
This paper investigates major decisions by binary elections in modern
democracies: what influences voters? Thinking in these crucial decisions,
how prone are they to biases? Do they realize what is good for them on
the one hand and society on the other, and can they act upon it? Is it
possible to detect common characteristics among the voters who opt for
populist candidates, or the policies those candidates support? We answer
these questions by using a carefully designed experimental survey that we
administered to a sample of in Greece.
Our study is exploratory in nature and does not aim to establish causality.
Instead, we wish to uncover potential correlations between behavioural fac-
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tors and the decision in the Greek referendum. To that end we recruited a
sample of 112 subjects at the University of Athens in July and September
2016. Our subjects are young (average age is approximately 22) and most
of them hold an undergraduate degree or study towards one. Their answers
in questions that aim to gauge their socio-economic background also indi-
cate no differenfes in that respect. During the experiment we administered
a battery of tests that measured risk aversion, loss aversion, depth of rea-
soning, ability to conduct backwards induction, distributional preferences
and the tendency to pick intuitive answers (the cognitive reflection test).
Our results show a strong correlation between the performance in CRT and
the voting choice in the referendum. More precisely, we find that voting No
is associated with about 0.35 fewer correct answers on average. That figure
corresponds to a 30% decrease in the correct answers of the average sub-
ject. We find no other statistical evidence for the differences in risk or loss
aversion, distributional preferences, depth of reasoning or performance in a
bargaining game. These results indicate that, at least among our sample,
different choices in the referendum are not driven by underlying differences
in preferences. On the contrary, such differences may be attributed to dif-
ferent cognitive processes employed by our subjects to make their mind
regarding their choice in the referendum. The finding that CRT is the only
variable with explanatory power is significant for those who study the rise
of populism and the failure of experts, despite overwhelming majorities
among them, to convince the electorate. Voters who are prone to System
I thinking may be more easily swayed by populist options that have the
tendency to be simple and intuitive than by thoughtful and nuanced argu-
ments that require engagement of System II. Consequently, the outcome
of the vote depends on the proportion of intuitive thinkers in the electorate.
Considering the vast number of games administered we skip the traditional
literature review here. Instead we are going to discuss relevant papers in
the literature when we discuss our experimental design and present results
of the respective games. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper
that combines properly incentivised experimental games in order to gauge
underlying preferences and cognitive biases and correlates the findings with
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choices in the political domain. The remainder of the paper is structured
as follows: Section 8 briefly gives the background of the Greek referendum.
The experimental design is presented in 9. The results of our experiment
are presented in 10. We conclude in Section 11.
8 The Greek referendum
This section is meant to give a brief description of the climate that lead to
the Greek referendum and its aftermath. We do not intend this to be an
exhaustive account of the Greek financial crisis or a thorough evaluation of
the political and economic consequences of the bailout agreement.
Since 2010 Greece has been receiving financial aid from the IMF and Eu-
ropean governments in order to finance a vast public deficit that peaked
at 15.1% in 20092 . In exchange for this financing the country agreed to
implement structural reforms. The belief was that those reforms would
improve the long term outlook of Greece. Support for this agreement in
Greece has been fickle. Political parties have shifted their stance more than
once and the public has switched allegiances as well, leading to the rise to
prominence of former political pariahs or start up parties, and the fall of
former behemoths. The structure of the program has also been criticised
as being sub-optimal (Ardagna and Caselli, 2014). The fiscal multipliers
used in order to calibrate the program have been questioned (Olivier and
Daniel, 2013), too. In January 2015, approximately five years since the
country first entered into an agreement for financial support, SYRIZA, one
of the upstart parties that previously had single digit support figures, won
the elections and formed a government with ANEL, a splinter party formed
from Conservative party (ND) dissidents. Both parties had been protesting
the financing agreement from the beginning and had formed what was collo-
quially known as the anti-memorandum front. Their gorvernment promised
to renegotiate the deal and redistribute the burdens of the structural re-
forms in ways that would alleviate those in the most precarious situations.
2According to the latest Eurostat data at the time of writing.
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In order to do so the government engaged in a highly publicised attempt to
improve the financing terms. The culmination of this process was the call
of the Greek Prime Minister for a referendum that would ask the electorate
to approve or reject the as of then latest offer by the European Union. The
Prime Minister announced his decision to hold the referendum in the small
hours of 27 June 20153. No prior notice had been given to the members
of the Eurozone or the media. Rumours of a referendum had been circu-
lating for months but they had been shut down by ministers and had not
gained enough credibility. The governmental proposal was approved by a
parliamentary vote the following day. The vote was held on 5 July 2015,
only eight days later.
The outcome of the vote was a rejection of the proposal of the European
Union by 61% of the electorate. After the announcement of the result the
Greek minister of finance and chief negotiator with the European Union
and the IMF resigned. On 8 July 2015 the government officially requested
a financing agreement from its creditors, promising to implement struc-
tural reforms in exchange. On 13 July 2015 Greece and its creditors agreed
to a new bailout package that, admittedly, contained larger pension cuts
and higher tax hikes than the package that had been rejected by the elec-
torate only a few days previously. After SYRIZA suffered a split of several
high-profile politicians who opposed the new agreement and its implemen-
tation, the government quit and new elections were called. The vote of
20 September 2015 returned again a majority of SYRIZA-ANEL with only
minor losses in their electoral percentage and parliament seats.
It is difficult to find objective answers to political questions. The choices are
often informed by the preferences of each individual. This means that rea-
sonable people may disagree. However, in the case of the Greek referendum
we can at least surmise an ex post optimal benchmark. This benchmark
is given by two facts. First, the government signed a new agreement only
days after the results were announced. One would find it hard to argue
that any fundamentals of the bargaining process had substantially changed
3A number of references to news pieces describing the situation at the time can be
found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek bailout referendum, 2015
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in such a short amount of time. In addition, the new agreement was not
an improvement over the old one, that was on offer up until the day the
referendum was announced4. Second, the electorate validated the decision
of the government shortly after in the general elections. This suggests that
the majority of the public believed the agreement was at least palatable.
9 Experimental design
The experiment took place over 7 sessions at the Experimental Laboratory
of the University of Athens in July and September 2016. We used ORSEE
Greiner (2004) to recruit 112 subjects 5, most of them around the age of
undergraduate students. The average duration of each session was just
under one hour and the average payment each subject received was 10
Euros. The average payment was equivalent to about three and a half
hours of work at the legally mandated minimum wage for workers aged
under 25. We payed about 0.60 Euros for the CRT plus approximately
9.40 Euros from the variable compensation task. We had a minimum wage
of 4 Euros, but all the subjects received more than the minimum.
We administrated a battery of test in the following order: ambiguity aver-
sion test Dimmock et al. (2016), the standard cognitive reflection test Fred-
erick (2005), a loss aversion test Gaechter et al. (2007), the undercutting
game designed to elicit levels of strategic sophistication Georganas et al.
(2015), a three stage alternating offers ultimatum game following John-
son et al. (2002) 6 designed to measure the subjects’ strategic myopia, five
three-person dictator games taken from Engelmann and Strobel (2004) to
get an indication for the kind of distributive preferences of the subjects, a
Holt and Laury (2002) lottery that measures risk aversion, the power to
take game Bosman and van Winden (2002) and three rounds of the cars
4See for example https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-13/
eu-demands-tsipras-capitulation-as-bailout-costs-spiral-ic1mkgo3 or https:
//www.politico.eu/article/greece-will-capitulate/. The first article shows that
Greece agreed to the demands of its lenders. The second one shows that this agreement
was foreseeable.
5Eight subjects did not declare the option they supported in the referendum and are
therefore excluded from our analysis.
6Note that the bargaining game and the power to take game were only administered
in September due to technical difficulties.
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game, a dynamic chicken game played in real time. No feedback was pro-
vided except for the cars game to minimise the effect of learning about the
other participants through their actions and preserve, as much as possible,
the preconceived beliefs of the subjects. The order of the games was chosen
in such a way that the tasks were not repetititive and cognitively taxing
tasks were positioned in between easier ones. The decisions regarding the
order of the tasks were informed by the feedback of subjects from pilot ses-
sions. The subjects were paid for one randomly chosen game. If a lottery
was drawn, they got paid for a randomly chosen selection from that lottery.
If the three person dictator game was chosen, they were paid for one ran-
domly chosen dictator game. If the cars game was chosen, they were paid
for one randomly chosen round of that game. CRT was incentivised with
0.50 Euros per correct answer on top of the compensation for the variable
task. Given the number of tasks administered, we will present the precise
design of each task in the section discussing the results in that task. For
the games that we will not discuss, we refer the reader to the appendix with
the experimental instructions and the screenshots from the experiment.
After the subjects had finished playing all the games, they were asked to
fill in a questionnaire that asked them basic demographic data, such as
age, gender and level of education, and questions regarding their political
behaviour. Among others we asked them what they had voted in the Greek
referendum of July 2015 and in the Greek parliamentary elections of Septe-
meber and January 2015. We chose to ask the political questions in the
end so as to keep the subjects agnostic of the aims of our study while they
were participating in the experimental tests. Table 7 presents descriptive
statistics for the subjects.
10 Results
10.1 An overview
Since we used a barrage of tests, we deem it appropriate to first present
the correlation matrix among our main variables. This is shown in 10.
As it is evident, the choice in the referendum correlates negatively with
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Table 7
Statistic No Voters Yes Voters Total
N Percentage N Percentage N
Subjects 60 57.7 44 42.3 104
Voted in the referendum 46 76.7 37 84.1 83
In favour of Grexit 23 38.3 1 2.27 24
Women 30 0.5 22 0.5 52
Studying towards or having undergraduate degree 51 85 39 88.63 90
Average age 23.5 22.6 23.2
Knowledge of the EU 1.25 1.09 1.21
(avg. correct answers)
the performance in the cognitive reflection test (CRT). There is also weak
correlation with the level-K exhibited by the subjects, as well as their risk
and loss aversion attitudes. Otherwise, our experimental measures from
different games are weakly correlated with each other. Table 8 describes
the variables used in the analyses.
Table 8: Description of Variables
Variable Name Description
Referendum (1=No) The choice of the subject in the referendum.
CRT The total number of correct answers in the CRT test
Reflective The subject is classified as reflective if she had at least
2 correct answers in the CRT.
Impulsive The subject is classified as impulsive if in the CRT she
chose the modal error at least twice.
Other The subject is classified as other if she cannot be classi-
fied as either impulsive or reflective.
Level K The subject’s level as inferred from her choice in the
Undercutting game.
Bargaining offer The subject’s offer in the first round of the bargaining
game.
Bargaining Look Up
(1=Yes)
Binary variable indicating whether the subject used the
option to look at the size of the pie in the following
rounds in the first round of the bargaining game.
Risk The number of risk averse choices made by the subject.
Loss The number of loss averse choices made by the subject.
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Figure 10: Correlation between the main variables.
10.2 Cognitive reflection test
We administrated the standard CRT Frederick (2005) consisting of three
questions:
1. A bat and a ball cost e1.10 in total. The bat costs e1.00 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how
long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
Many researchers have noted the existence of two cognitive processes. One
process is quick and relies on intuition. The other is slow and involves more
deliberate thinking. Those processes are popularly know as ”System 1” and
”System 2” (Kahneman, 2011). CRT has been shown to reliably capture
the tendency to rely on ”System 1” when attempting to find the answer
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Figure 11: Number of correct choices with error bars in the three questions
of the CRT by choice in the Greek referendum of July 2015.
to a puzzle. On many political issues the choice comes down to an option
that appears appealing at first glance and one that seems counterintuitive.
We do not argue that the appealing option is always correct, however, it
may be the case that appealing options have unintended consequences and
on further inspection, the counterintuive answer is preferable.
Result 5 Subjects who voted Yes in the Greek referendum made more cor-
rect choices in the CRT test.
The subjects who declared that voted Yes gave on average 1.36 correct an-
swers. In contrast, those who declared they voted No gave on average 0.95
correct answers. The difference is highly statistically significant (two-tailed
Chi-squared test without Yates’ correction, p-value=0.0031) 7 Further evi-
dence for this result are given in table 9, columns 1 and 2. There it is shown
that a No vote is associated on average with about 0.36 fewer answers.
In order to further examine the relationship between the vote in the refer-
endum and the performance in the CRT we followed Cueva et al. (2016)
7We use a Chi-squared test because both the sum of the rows and the sum of the
columns of our 2 × 4 table were not determined before the experiment. Therefore,
following the suggestion in Ludbrook (2008) a Chi-squared test is preferred to the Fisher
exact test which yields a p-value=0.018. Consequently, the choice of the statistical test
does not influence our results.
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in assigning our subjects in three categories based on their replies. The
subjects that answered at least two questions correctly were classified as
Reflective. The subjects who made the modal error in at least two ques-
tions were classified as Impulsive. All the rest were classified as Other. The
idea is that if a subject gives at least two correct answers, once can with
relative safety assume that they are more likely to use System II. On the
other hand, if a subject makes the modal error twice, she is more likely to
use System I. As can be seen in table 9, voting No in the referendum is cor-
related positively with Impulsive and negatively with Reflective. However,
the p-values of both estimates is just outside the usual levels of statistical
significance. Therefore, these regressions at best provide only suggestive
evidence regarding the relationship between Reflective (Impulsive) and the
vote in the referendum.
Table 9: Results of OLS regressions.
Dependent variable:
CRT Impulsive Reflective Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Referendum (1=No) −0.414 −0.359 0.119 −0.125 0.006
p = 0.009∗∗∗ p = 0.018∗∗ p = 0.181 p = 0.168 p = 0.948
EU Knowledge −0.090 0.028 −0.042 0.014
p = 0.359 p = 0.626 p = 0.479 p = 0.831
Male 0.486 −0.098 0.325 −0.227
p = 0.002∗∗∗ p = 0.263 p = 0.0005∗∗∗ p = 0.022∗∗
Age −0.021 0.017 −0.003 −0.014
p = 0.250 p = 0.112 p = 0.766 p = 0.248
Constant 1.364 1.699 −0.195 0.368 0.827
p = 0.000∗∗∗ p = 0.0003∗∗∗ p = 0.457 p = 0.173 p = 0.006∗∗∗
Observations 104 103 103 103 103
R2 0.066 0.169 0.064 0.139 0.066
Note: Errors at the subject level. P-values in brackets. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
There has been a discussion on whether the proliferation of studies admin-
istering CRT is causing the test to lose its efficacy Toplak et al. (2014). A
recent metastudy Branas-Garza et al. (2015) finds little support for that
conjecture when only laboratory studies are included. Additionaly, our ex-
periment was the first to ever take place at the University of Athens, we
know of no other study that has administered CRT in Greece and there
seems to be no reason why previous exposure to the CRT is correlated with
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the voting decisions of our subjects in the first place. Hence, we believe
that CRT is a valid measure of our subjects ability to override their instic-
tive tendencies and provide the correct answers.
10.3 Risk and Loss aversion
One can argue that the decision made in the referendum could be related to
attitudes regarding risk and loss aversion. The NO option was inherently
more risky, as the range of potential outcomes was, admittedly, wider. On
the other hand, YES was a relatively known quantity. In order to test
for that assumption we administered the Holt and Laury (Holt and Laury,
2002) measure of risk preferences, which can be seen in table 10.
Result 6 There is no difference in risk preferences between No and Yes
voters.
The justification for this result can be seen in table 11, in column 1. Risk-
Total is the number of risk averse choices made by the subjects. The
coefficient is not statistically significant at any conventional level.
Table 10: Risk aversion choices
The following table presents you with ten scenaria. In each of them indicate which one you choose:
Scenario A B
1 e1 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
2 e2 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
3 e3 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
4 e4 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
5 e5 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
6 e6 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
7 e7 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
8 e8 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
9 e9 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
10 e10 with certainty e10 with probability 50% or e0 with probability 50%
Similarly, one could argue that the reference points of the voters or their
sensitivity to loss might differ. Our design controls as much as possible for
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the different reference points. Our sample is homogeneous with respect to
age, level of education and sex. Additionaly, we asked our subjects to how
many countries they have been abroad, as a measure to gauge their financial
status. Yes voters had been on average to 5.25 foreign countries, whereas
No voters had been on average to 4.27 countries. The difference is not
statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction
p-value=0.16). We argue therefore that our findings are more indicative of
differences in the sensitivity to loss.
Result 7 There is no difference in loss aversion between No and Yes vot-
ers.
The justification for this result can be seen in table 11, in column 2. LossTo-
tal is the number of risk averse choices made by the subjects. The coefficient
is not statistically significant at any conventional level.
Table 11: Risk and loss aversion regressions
Dependent variable:
RiskTotal LossTotal
(1) (2)
Referendum (1=No) −0.242 0.360
p = 0.166 p = 0.158
EU Knowledge −0.096 0.176
p = 0.400 p = 0.290
Male −0.123 0.133
p = 0.476 p = 0.596
Age 0.028 −0.074
p = 0.197 p = 0.021∗∗
Constant 0.445 5.751
p = 0.389 p = 0.000∗∗∗
Observations 103 103
Note: Errors at the subject level. P-values in brackets. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 12: Loss aversion choices
At first you are given e8. The computer will flip a coin.
The outcome is either head or tail. Both outcomes are equally likely.
In each of the following scenaria, do you accept or reject the bet?
Scenario Head Tail
1 Lose e2 Win e6
2 Lose e3 Win e6
3 Lose e4 Win e6
4 Lose e5 Win e6
5 Lose e6 Win e6
6 Lose e7 Win e6
10.4 Level K and Bargaining
Next, we turn our examination to measures of strategic sophistication. The
negotiation process is, at its essence, a bargaining game. For that reason
we used the bargaining game in Johnson et al. (2002) to observe the sub-
jects behaviour in a bargaining game which requires the use of backwards
induction to calculate the Nash equilibrium. This particular set up also al-
lowed us to investigate what pieces of information the subjects considered
relevant in order to formulate their offers.
In sequential games subgame perfections calls for the players to look at
the final nodes and start moving backwards in order to calculate the sub-
game perfect equilibrium. Those of us who have taken a series of courses
in game theory may find backwards induction a rather intuitive and simple
way of calculating our strategies in a sequential game. However, experi-
mental tests of backward induction typically fail to find strong support for
the predictions of the theoretical models (Levitt et al., 2011). Restrict-
ing our attention to one-shot games, therefore removing strategic concerns
arising from repeatead games, three explanations have been proposed in
the literature. The first suggests subjects have other regarding preferences
that lead them to take decisions different from the ones predicted by the
standard fully rational, self regarding, models. The second is that sophis-
ticated subjects may respond to naive agents. The third one proposes that
backward induction is in fact a rather complex and unintuitive process that
requires the subjects to consider what will happen at nodes game far from
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the one they currently occupy. To make things harder, according to theory
one has to consider what will happen at those nodes even though she is
not expected to ever reach them. In other words, backward induction asks
us to consider future hypotheticals, a task that may not be so easy to the
uninitiated.
Take for example a three round, alternating offers ultimatum game in which
two subjects, Proposer 1 and Proposer 2, have to divide a shrinking pie.
Backward induction predicts that Proposer 1 will look at round three and
determine what is the maximum she can make in that round. Then she
will consider round two and calculate the maximum Proposer 2 can hope
to extract in that round given what Proposer 1 can guarantee herself if she
rejects the offer. Finally, in round one Proposer 1 will offer to Proposer 2
the exact amount the latter will get in round two. Assuming both players
are national and common knowledge of that rationality, the game ends in
round one without ever reaching the following nodes. We administered the
experiment described above with one twist: In order for Proposer 1 to gain
information for the size of the pie in any round, the current or a future
one, she had to click on a tab on her screen. All the tabs were closed
by default and at most one tab could be open at any given time. There
was no time limit for a subject to make a decision and they could open
whichever tabs they wanted, as many times the liked at no cost. When
the subjects were ready to make an offer, they would enter a number in
a box and press continue. In order to eliminate concerns for social pref-
erences we made Proposer 2 a computerised player, programmed to play
the standard, self-interested, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. and we
informed the subjects about its strategy. More precisely, we told them the
computerised player wants to make as much money as possible and does
not care about the earnings of the human player. In addition, it expects
them to try to make as much as possible and it realises human subjects
have been informed of its strategy. Our experiment follows very closely
one of the treatments in Johnson et al. (2002). The size of the pie in the
first round was e20, in the second e10 and in the third e5. Therefore, the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the subject to offer e5 in the first
round.
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Result 8 The choice in the referendum does not influence the offer in the
bargaining game.
The justification for this result can be seen in table 13, in column 1. Offer1
is the offer made by the subjects in round 1. Most of the subjects ended
the game in the first round, therefore there is no need to analyse offers in
further rounds.
Result 9 Yes voters do not look at the size of the pie in future rounds
more often than No voters.
The justification for this result can be seen in table 13, in column 2.
LookUp12 is 1 if the subject in round 1 opened that tab that contained the
information regarding the size of the pie in round 2. It is zero otherwise.
All of the subjects who looked at the size of the pie in round 3 looked at
the size of the pie in round 2 as well. Therefore, there is no need to analyse
look ups in rounds other than the second. This finding indicates that No
and Yes voters do not differ in their ability to conduct backwards induction.
Various experimental measures of level-K have been used in the literature.
We used an one shot normal form game like the ones used in Georganas
et al. (2015), called the Undercutting game, which allows for detection of
higher levels of depth of reasoning. The payoff matrix of the game we ad-
ministered can be seen in figure 12. A level-0 player is one who has no clue
about this situation and simply picks an action at random. Since a level-0
player would consider all the actions in this game, she would play E with
positive probability. E is a dominated action and no other player would
choose it. Therefore choosing E is a safe indication that someone is a level-0
player. A player who believes her opponent to be level-0 would be level-1.
That player would choose D since that is the best response, assuming the
level-0 player randomises among actions using the uniform distribution. A
level-2 player would believe her opponent is level-1 and choose C. A level-3
player would choose B and a level-4 player’s choice would coincide with that
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Table 13: Level K and bargaining regressions
Dependent variable:
offer1 LookUp12 LevelK
(1) (2) (3)
Referendum (1=No) −0.378 0.102 0.200
p = 0.911 p = 0.276 p = 0.461
CRTtotal −6.561 0.053 0.188
p = 0.011∗∗ p = 0.390 p = 0.289
EU knowledge 1.033 0.048 −0.201
p = 0.628 p = 0.424 p = 0.242
Male 5.891 −0.040 −0.009
p = 0.132 p = 0.674 p = 0.973
Age −0.944 −0.016 −0.008
p = 0.115 p = 0.155 p = 0.815
LookUp12 0.209
p = 0.480
RiskTotal −1.617 0.059 −0.065
p = 0.371 p = 0.265 p = 0.668
Constant 36.880 0.435 2.109
p = 0.012∗∗ p = 0.132 p = 0.014∗∗
Observations 60 103 103
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 12: The Undercutting game.
of all higher level players up to Nash and would be A. The subjects were
randomly matched with each other and were informed they were playing
against another player in the room.
Result 10 Choice in the referendum does not predict the degree of sophis-
tication.
The justification for this result can be seen in table 13, in column 3. Lev-
elK is the level of reasoning implied by the choice each subject made in the
Undercutting game.
10.5 Distributional preferences
Finally, we administered five three person dictator games in order to get
an indication regarding the subjects distributional preferences. Political
choices, including those in a referendum, may be driven by preferences
regarding the distribution of wealth in the economy. Besides, the govern-
ment that called the referendum was elected promising to redistribute the
burdens of the financing agreement. The games we used are taken from En-
gelmann and Strobel (2004) and correspond to their Fx, Ex, N, R and Ey
treatments. The subjects were divided in groups of three and were asked
to make decisions as if they were Person 2. They were told this game was
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chosen to determine their payment, then the decision of one of the group’s
members would be implemented.
In each of these five games a subject can pick one of three distributions. At
least one distribution maximises maximin preferences and one maximises
efficiency preferences. We diverge from the classification in Engelmann
and Strobel (2004) in that we do not explicitly consider preferences that
lie in between maximin and efficiency maximisation. Instead, because of
the number of times our subjects chose it, we call choice B as indicating a
third category, which we call ”Other”. The games can be seen in table 14
Table 14: Dictator games
Dictator game
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
Allocation A B C A B C A B C
Person 1 17 10 9 21 17 13 16 13 10
Person 2 10 10 5 12 12 12 8 8 8
Person 3 9 10 1 3 4 5 5 3 1
Efficiency A A A
Maximin A C A
Other B B B
Game 4 Game 5
Allocation A B C A B C
Person 1 11 12 2 21 9 3
Person 2 8 12 3 17 9 4
Person 3 9 12 4 13 9 5
Efficiency A A A
Maximin C C
Other B B
Result 11 The distributional preferences do not differ between those who
voted Yes and those who voted No.
In order to test for differences in the distributional preferences we counted
the number of times each subject made a choice that corresponded to ”Ef-
ficiency”, ”maximin” or ”Other. If a subject had made more ”Efficiency”
choices, was considered an efficiency maximiser. If a subject had made
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more ”maximin” choices, was considered a maximin player. If the subject
had made more ”Other” choices, was considered to belong to the other
category. There were a 6 subjects that following this classification algorith
were not assigned to any of the above categories and were considered un-
categorisable. After this categorisation, we performed a Chi-squared test.
The test shows no differences at the usual levels (p-value=0.102). However,
the p-value is marginal and may be considered suggestive evidence for the
presence of such differences.
11 Conclusions
We have administered a battery of tests in order to uncover behavioural
reasons that correlated with the vote in the Greek referendum of July 2015.
Our experiments took place at the University of Athens and our pool con-
sists of 112 subjects, approximately 22 years of age with an undergraduate
degree. Our scope was to investigate the existence of behavioural differ-
ences, not to produce a nationally representative sample.
Our tests show that the strongest correlation is between the performance
in the Cognitive Reflection Test. In particular, a smaller number of correct
choices is correlated with those who voted No. In the literature a low num-
ber of correct choices in CRT is associated with impulsivity and increased
used of the System I thinking process, which is fast and intuitive. One
could then argue that the No option was the more intuitive answer to the
question posed to the electorate.
We find only suggestive evidence, that fail to cross the usual thresholds for
statistical significance, regarding differences in risk and loss aversion and
distributional preferences. All three of them may be considered factors that
can influence the choice in any elections. Frequently candidates promote
themselves as the stable option, strongly indicating that the status quo
is not threatened by them. Or, in contrast, others present themselves as
disrupting forces, that come to overturn the establishment. However, in
the context of the Greek referendum, we do not find compelling statistical
evidence to support the notion that framing the choices as risky or po-
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tentially causing a loss swayed the part of the electorate that matched the
characteristics of our sample. The same holds for distributional preferences.
Finally, we administered two tests design to gauge the ability of our subjects
to conduct backwards induction and to measure their depth of reasoning.
Given that election choices might refere to complicated strategic environ-
ments, it was worth checking whether the ability of our subjects to reason
strategically played a role. We find no evidence that such abilities were
correlated with either choice in the referendum.
Rice Farming and the Emergence of Cooperative Behav-
ior
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Abstract
The origins of the observed differences in cooperativeness among
societies have puzzled social scientists for years. This paper presents
evidence that these origins may be attributed to cultural norms
shaped by environmental factors and transmitted intergenerationally,
even when the original conditions that lead to their birth are no
longer present. In addition we present evidence that the norm trans-
mission operates via the attitude with respect to punishing free rid-
ers. In particular, we hypothesise that the cultivation of paddy
rice hundreds of years ago influences the decisions made in our in-
centivised economic games. Unlike cultivating other crops, such as
wheat or corn, farming rice historically required extensive cooper-
ation among farmers. Therefore, centuries of rice farming might
lead to the creation of a cooperative social norm that affects peo-
ple living in that society and who transmit it from generation to
generation. To test this hypothesis, we travelled to four typical rice
and non-rice provinces in China and recruited a total of 524 local
undergraduate students as subjects. We find that rice subjects con-
tribute more than their non-rice counterparts in the Public Goods
Game with and without punishment, with the effect being a lot more
pronounced in the former. Further analyses reveal a significant dif-
ference in frequency, though not in magnitude of punishment, but
no difference in how the two groups react to punishment. It follows
that the different levels of cooperativeness observed in the punish-
ment treatments are a direct effect of the significant differences in
the frequency of punishment. Furthermore, as there is no difference
between the two groups in the ultimatum and in the dictator game,
we interpret from our results that rice cultivation does not make
people more cooperative per se. Instead, it is more likely the case
that people in rice regions understand the nature of public goods
differently than their non-rice counterparts. We attribute the dif-
ferences to a cultural norm resulting from a history of farming that
affects the whole population living in that society. We complement
our findings using a natural field experiment and two surveys re-
garding the provision of three different public goods. In all these
measures we find evidence of higher provision in rice areas, lending
external validity to our experimental results.
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Part III
Rice Farming and the Emergence of
Cooperative Behavior
12 Introduction
Studies have documented that people’s level of cooperativeness differs across
countries and societies.8 However, the reason that these differences exist in
the first place remains an open question. Understanding the factors that
make people more cooperative is important, as the level of cooperation is
associated with economic and political outcomes such as economic devel-
opment (Knack and Keefer, 1997) as well as norms of civic cooperation and
rules of law (Herrmann et al., 2008).
In this paper, we show that a traditional agricultural activity practiced
hundreds of years ago gave rise to a cooperative social norm that persisted
over generations. We find that this norm has a profound influence on sub-
jects’ behaviour in an incentivised and strategic setting. The agricultural
activity refers to the cultivation of rice. Two features of rice farming dis-
tinguish itself from other crops, such as wheat and corn. First, rice grows
on standing water instead of dry land, and farmers in a village tradition-
ally share the same water reserves. This resulted in the need to cooperate
in the management of the common resource and in the maintenance of
the irrigation system. In addition, rice farming requires a large amount
of labour. Farmers first need to grow rice seedlings in separate lands and
then transplant rice seedlings into paddy fields. This necessitated a large
amount of labour. Indeed, agricultural anthropologists conclude that the
amount of labour required in rice cultivation is at least twice as the number
needed in comparison to farming wheat (Buck, 1935). Therefore, families
8See Herrmann et al. (2008) and Henrich et al. (2006) for differences in punishing
behavior in the Public Goods Game (PGG), Ga¨chter et al. (2010) and Ga¨chter and
Herrmann (2009) for differences in cooperation in the PGG, and Jackson and Xing
(2014) for different behaviors in the coordination game.
62
with only a few labour forces will not be able to survive if they rely on rice
farming (Hsiao-Tung and Chih-i, 1945). To solve the shortage of labour
supply during farming and harvesting seasons, farmers in rice villages form
cooperative labour exchanges. Farmers also summon their relatives who
live in neighbouring villages to deal with the labour shortage issue. In
sum, farming rice historically requires extensive cooperation among farm-
ers and non-farmers, and the hypothesis is that centuries of rice farming
leads to a cooperative social norm that is intergenerationally transmittable.
To test this hypothesis, we travelled to typical rice and non-rice provinces
in China and conducted lab experiments at local universities. We believe
that China is a perfect testbed for the rice theory. Agriculture has been
the most important industry throughout China’s history. During China’s
imperial era, most of the population were farmers.9 Even in 2011, about
34.8% of China’s population was employed in the agricultural sector (World
Bank). More importantly, China also has a long history of rice cultivation
(Fan, 2007).
Following Talhelm et al. (2014), the categorization of rice and non-rice re-
gions is based on the proportion of cultivated land devoted to rice paddy
fields. We use the earliest available data from the National Bureau of
Statistics website (1996), because we do not want the farming statistics to
be affected by recent technological advances, but rather to reflect, as closely
as possible, the historical farming choices. Indeed, the two rice provinces in
our sample have been prominent rice production provinces since the Song
Dynasty (960 – 1279) (Fan, 2007).
We recruited local, Han Chinese, first year university students based on
their Hukou. We obtained data on the subjects’ place of origin on their
Hukou from the official records kept at their universities. Hukou is a house-
hold registration system employed in China. The policy requires that in-
dividuals must register the Hukou at their city of residence and they can
only register their Hukou at one city. By local students we mean that their
9See “A Brief History of China’s Economy” edited by Fudan University and Shanghai
University of Finance and Economics (1982)
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Hukou was registered at the province of experiment. For example, if the
experiment was conducted in Hebei, which is a typical non-rice province,
subjects with Hebei Hukou were recruited.10 We also asked the subjects
to self-report the place where they grew up. The two measures are highly
correlated (Spearman’s rho 0.9557, p < 0.001), thus we use the place of
origin based on their Hukou, as that is the official record.
To measure the difference of cooperativeness between rice and non-rice sub-
jects, we implemented the Public Goods Game (PGG) with and without
punishment. Moreover, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the
differences between rice and non-rice provinces, we also asked subjects to
participate in a dictator game (DG), an ultimatum game (UG), and a co-
ordination game.
There are several important features of our experimental design worth men-
tioning. First and foremost, our subjects were not farmers but university
students who had minimal farming experiences.11 Therefore, the present
study goes beyond merely testing the effect of rice farming on farmers’ coop-
erativeness. Instead, we aim to investigate whether hundreds of years of rice
farming is capable of creating a cooperative social norm that affects every-
one in the society and that transmits fairly unchanged from generation to
generation. Second, we travelled to the selected rice and non-rice provinces
and conducted the experiments locally. We believe that the sample in our
study is more representative and has less selection issues that might have
burdened similar studies that relied on students recruited from one Bei-
jing university 12. The reason is that Beijing universities set small quotas
for students from provinces other than Beijing, therefore, non-Beijing stu-
dents who intend to study there face stronger competition. Consequently,
the majority of high school graduates choose local universities. Third, by
recruiting Han Chinese University students, a number of potential con-
founds are controlled by design, such as educational background, language,
culture, and political institution. And last, we have a relatively rich data
10Read the experimental section for a detailed discussion of the recruitment criteria
and procedure.
11See the experimental design section for a discussion of why this is the case.
12A large proportion of subjects in Talhelm et al. (2014) were recruited in Beijing
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set that allows us to link individuals to administrative data such as their
Hukou type (Rural or Urban) and the local GDP measure.
We find that rice subjects contribute more than non-rice subjects in both
the PGGs with and without punishment. In the no punishment condition,
although rice subject’s contribution is higher, the difference is relatively
weak. Rice subjects also experience a stronger end game effect, as the
contribution unravels to the same level as non-rice subjects in the last pe-
riod. On the contrary, the difference in contribution is substantial in the
punishment condition. Rice subject’s contribution is already significantly
higher than non-rice in the first period. More importantly, the difference
not only sustains but also enlarges towards the end. We also find that rice
subjects are more likely to punish free-riders compared to their non-rice
counterparts and there is no difference in the intensity of punishment con-
ditional on punishing. Additionally, the two groups do not differ in how
they respond to punishment. It follows that the different levels of cooper-
ativeness observed in the punishment condition is a direct consequence of
the significant differences in punishment behavior. Furthermore, as there
is no difference between the two groups in the ultimatum game and in the
dictator game, we interpret from our results that rice cultivation does not
make people more cooperative per se. Instead, it is more likely the case
that people in rice regions understand the nature of public goods differently
than their non-rice counterparts. And last, we run a series of robustness
checks and show that the conclusions are less likely driven by self-selection
and omitted variable bias.
One might be concerned that these differences are only noticeable in the ar-
tificial circumstances of lab experiments. In order to address these concerns
we also tested the hypothesis using data from one natural field experiment
and two surveys regarding the provision of public goods. The natural field
experiment refers to the contributions to Wikipedia. The on-line encyclope-
dia depends on voluntary contributions for its content and once content has
been added on a page it is accessible to anyone, regardless of whether they
contributed or not. Therefore, Wikipedia is a prototypical public good.
We focus on the Chinese language version in order to minimise noise from
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contributors who are not Han Chinese. In order to circumvent the problem
of the widespread use of VPN services in mainland China that render the
geolocation of contributors via their IP address potentially meaningless,
we only used data from the pages of 206 Chinese cities listed on Wikipedia
13. We argue that thank to the topic of those pages contributors are more
likely to be related to the cities and therefore indirectly provide a way
to pin down their origins. We find that even when we control for GDP
and the popularity of a page, the number of edits per 1000 residents, our
measure of contributions, is statistically significantly higher on the pages
of cities in rice areas. Furthermore, we use data from the sixth wave of
the World Values Surveys. From the answers in the the survey we con-
struct two measures of volunteering, one in the intensive and one in the
extensive margin. After controlling for a number of other variables, we
find statistically differences in both measures. Finally, we use the Chinese
Family Panel Studies survey, a large, representative survey of the Chinese
population. The questionnaire contains interviewer’s observations on the
tidiness of the street of the interviewee. We argue that the tidiness of the
street is a local public good. According to our analysis the streets of the
interviewees in rice provinces are tidier. Even though our complementary
measures taken individually have limitations, taken as a whole they point
to actual differences in the willingness to provide public goods in China.
In all cases the differences are in line with our experimental results and
support the hypothesis we tested.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses experimen-
tal methods to show how centuries old agricultural activities have a long
lasting and profound effect on individual’s level of cooperativeness and pun-
ishing behaviour nowadays. We go beyond demonstrating mere differences,
investigating the mechanism that gives rise to them. We show that in this
case the difference in the probability of punishing free riders is the main
channel. Finally, we go beyond the current literature relating our experi-
mental results to various measures of contributions to public goods outside
13The list that we used to find those cities can be found on: https:
//zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E8%8F%AF%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%
E5%85%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9C%8B%E5%9F%8E%E5%B8%82%E4%BA%BA%
E5%8F%A3%E6%8E%92%E5%90%8D
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of the laboratory, demonstrating that these measures support our exper-
imental results. The paper most related to ours is Talhelm et al. (2014),
who found that people from rice and wheat areas in China have different
thinking styles, as measured by the Triad task.14 However, unlike Talhelm
et al. (2014), we focus our attention on the economically relevant aspects of
behaviour in incentivized and strategic situations. We also administrated
the Triad task and find no difference between the rice and non-rice subjects
in our sample. More importantly, our results are not attenuated by con-
trolling for the thinking style. This suggests that our results are mediated
from a different channel other than thinking styles. Another closely related
paper is that by Soo Hong et al. (2015) who find that the amount of rice
paddy fields is associated with higher levels of cooperativeness, as measured
by a one shot PGG without punishment. Their experimental design has
substantial differences to ours. First, the use of an one shot game without
punishment does not allow them to investigate the channel that leads to
those differences. In our experiment we conclude that the cultivation of
rice has little effect on people’s cooperativeness per se, instead the biggest
effect comes through teaching the individuals how to use punishment to
foster cooperation. We are also able to reject the thinking style and social
preferences as the drivers behind our results. Moreover, they conducted
their experiments in Beijing. We have already explained why a sample of
students recruited from Beijing may not be representative of their original
provinces. The fact that the finding of Soo Hong et al. (2015) is in line with
ours shows that the effect of the cultural norm we detected may hold even
among the part of the distribution to which the highly selected students in
Beijing belong. Hence, we view our results as complementary to ours.
This research contributes to the emerging literature that aims to explore the
origins of the observed differences in people’s preferences across societies.
Alesina et al. (2013) investigate the origins of cross-cultural differences in
norms regarding gender roles. They find that societies which historically
practice plough agriculture have less equal gender norms in the work place.
14We use the rice and non-rice terminology instead of rice and wheat. This is because
in addition to wheat, there are other types of crops that require less cooperation to farm,
such as corn. Note that the categorization of rice and non-rice provinces is exactly the
same as rice and wheat.
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The rationale behind this observation is that the use of plough requires a
considerable level of upper body strength, hence, men have a relative ad-
vantage in the workplace in those societies. Galor and O¨zak (2016) find that
participation in agricultural activities affects people’s time preferences. In
particular, they argue that because the agricultural sector yields higher but
delayed returns farmers are more future oriented. Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) find that the level of mistrust within Africa stems from the transat-
lantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. There is also a small but emerging
literature that utilises lab or lab-in-the field experiments to explore the ob-
served differences in preferences across countries. Gneezy et al. (2016) and
Leibbrandt et al. (2013) find that sea fishermen are more cooperative and
less competitive than lake fishermen. They argue that this is because the
difference in work place organization between the two groups: sea fishing
requires intensive team work among crew members in order to survive in
the sea, while lake fishing is usually an individual activity. Carpenter and
Seki (2006) also find evidence supporting the idea that work place organi-
zation has profound influences on cooperation.
The present paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, we con-
tribute by focusing on explaining the origins of cross cultural differences in
cooperativeness, complementing papers that have focused on gender norms,
time preferences, and trust. Second, we go one step further identifying the
exact channel that gives rise to these differences. In our case it appears to be
the use of punishment and not inherent differences in pro-social preferences
or strategic behaviour. Third, our subjects were university students with
very similar back grounds and have minimal farming experiences. This not
only shows that our results are less likely driven by other factors, but also
suggests that the social norm created by rice farming is able to influence
people even outside the agriculture sector and is stable across generations.
This result is in sharp contrast to the findings of Gneezy et al. (2016)
and Leibbrandt et al. (2013) who do not detect any behavioral differences
among women in the two societies who do not fish, and they conclude that
“... suggestive evidence that norms of cooperation learnt at the workplace
do not spread to other society members” (Gneezy et al., 2016, p. 2). Fi-
nally, we have a better way to control for self-selection or migration into
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or out of rice areas that may bias our estimations. We do so by merging
our experimental observations with administrative data obtained from the
universities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 13 illustrates
the experimental design. Non-parametric and regression results are pre-
sented in section 14. A series of Robustness checks are ran in section 15.
We present complementary evidence from surveys and a natural field ex-
periment in section 16 Section 17 concludes.
13 Experimental Design
The ideal experimental design would compare subjects of identical back-
grounds that differ only in the type of cultivation in the area where they
were exposed. Our recruiting protocol attempted to get as close to this
ideal as practically possible. Another feature of our design is the recruit-
ment of subjects that are not farmers themshelves. We, thus, test for the
existence of an intergenerationally transmittable cultural norm, not merely
for a norm shaped by ecological factors.
13.1 Province selection
We conducted lab experiments in four universities that are located in
four provinces across China. The provinces were chosen from the list of
provinces in Talhelm et al. (2014) that had more (less) than 70% (10%)
of cultivated land devoted to rice and according to lab availability. By re-
stricting the sample to Chinese subjects, a number of potential confounds,
such as language, political institutions and other cross country cultural dif-
ferences are controlled by design.
Since we are investigating the intergenerational transmission of a social
norm brought about by rice farming, the categorization of rice and non-
rice provinces should be based on the type of crops farmers historically
cultivated. For this purpose, we use the earliest available cultivation data
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics table
Non-Rice Rice
Hebei Shandong Hunan Zhejiang
Subjects
Female 55.7% 74.3% 57.9% 55.6%
Rural 69.9% 60.5% 59.5% 66.9%
Natural Sciences Stream 67.8% 55.9% 50.8% 71.8%
Only Child 31.3% 41.4% 40.5% 62.1%
Relative Income 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.0
Collectivist Thinking 81.1% 82.7% 84.3% 78.2%
Provinces
University Rank 100-120 100-140 130-150 250-300
Minimum Wage (in U) 12-15 13-16 10.7-13.5 12.5-17
Percentage of Rice 1.9% 2.3% 78.9% 83.1%
Subjects 116 156 128 124
(1996) from the Bureau of Statistics Web site.15 Following Talhelm et al.
(2014), a province is classified as rice if more than half of its cultivated
land is devoted to rice paddy fields. The two rice provinces we chose were
Hunan and Zhejiang province, which devoted more than 78% of the culti-
vated lands to paddy fields. Also note that these two provinces have been
prominent rice farming provinces since the Song Dynasty (Fan, 2007). The
percentage of rice paddy fields was less than 2.5% in the non-rice provinces:
Hebei and Shandong. Table 15 presents descriptive statistics for the sub-
jects.
13.2 Subject Recruitment
We recruited local, Han, first year university students. We argue that our
subjects have minimal farming experience. About 40% of the subjects in
our sample hold an urban Hukou which implies that their families do not
have the legal right to possess farming lands.16 These students live in urban
areas and hence have minimal experience in agricultural activities. The rest
15http://www.stats.gov.cn
16According to China’s Hukou policy, only people with a Rural Hukou are entitled
with farming land.
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of our sample are students from rural areas, which implies that their fami-
lies are entitled to farm lands and hence they might have sufficient farming
experience. However, we argue in the following that this is not the case.
Firstly, the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (Gaokao) is
the most important exam not only for students, but also for the schools,
since their ranking depends on the student’s performance. Therefore, for
the three years of study in the senior high school, they have a very busy
schedule in order to succeed in the exam. Secondly, high schools are gen-
erally located in larger cities. Commuting between school and home might
be too costly, in terms of time and money, for students who have a rural
Hukou. Therefore, they need to live on campus during school days and
hence it is not possible to work in the field. One might argue that they
can help their families during weekends or holidays. However, we doubt
this limited time of farming experience would able to become a major
influence on their behavior. Third, rice cultivation nowadays requires less
cooperation due to advances in technology, therefore, even if subjects spent
sufficient time in rice farming, the norm of cooperation stems from the tra-
ditional farming techniques, rather than the modern practice. Fourth, in
our analyses we controlled for a subject’s Hukou, and the results are not
affected. This suggests that even if subjects from rural areas have suffi-
cient farming experience, our results are not mediated by them, instead
we are capturing an intergenerationally transmitted norm. Finally, we also
tested whether within rice regions, subject who have rural Hukou behave
differently from subjects who have urban Hukou. We find small differences
in this regard. More precisely, subjects from rural rice areas employ more
prosocial punishment than their counterparts from urban rice areas. We
believe this result shows both the channel through which the norm operates
and validates our view that the norm is well established in the regions and
is minimally affected by current practices. Thus, we believe that our results
are less likely to be mediated by the subjects’ personal farming experiences
and more likely to be influenced by the intergenerational transmission of
the social nom related to the crops that used to be predominantly culti-
vated in their regions.
We recruited local university students for three important reasons. First,
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this reduces the chance of recruiting subjects from less typical provinces.
For example, in Sichuan and Jiangsu, the percentage of farming land de-
voted to rice and non-rice crops is very close to each other. Second, since
reciprocity is an important motivation in the PGGs (Fischbacher et al.,
2001), behavioral norms might be hard to emerge if rice and non-rice sub-
jects interact. And third, having a local Hukou suggests that the subject
has more likely been living in the area for a long time and hence is more
affected by the social norm.17
We chose Han Chinese because Wen et al. (2004) show that Han Chinese
have the same cultural origin. We also recruited first year students be-
cause they had just graduated from high school. Chinese high schools have
a busy and nationally mandated curriculum: students spend more than
seven hours per day in the classroom and study similar material. There-
fore, subjects had similar experience prior to university. Moreover, first
year students are free from the indoctrination effect of their field of study.18
The recruitment process was the following. A list of qualified students was
provided by each university, and we randomly drew subjects from the list.
Selected subjects were then contacted by the administrative staff of each
university. We provided a script about how to recruit the students. We
emphasized that it was an economic study, they would receive mmonetary
reimbursement for their time, their decisions in the study would be anony-
mous and would not affect their records related to university in any way,
and, most importantly, participation was not compulsory.
17When analyzing the data, we find that a few subject’s Hukou was not from the
province of the experiment. In order to utilize as many observations as possible, we drop
subjects whose Hukou was from a province farming a crop different from that of the
experimental province. For example, if the experiment was conducted in a rice province,
we drop subjects whose Hukou is from non-rice farming provinces. The results are the
same if we drop subjects whose Hukou province was different from the experimental
province.
18There were 9 subjects who were not first year students. Including or excluding them
does not affect our results and hence we include them in the analyses.
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13.3 Experimental Games
To compare the level of cooperation between rice and non-rice areas, we
conducted a repeated public goods game (PGG) with and without pun-
ishment. We believe that the situation farmers encounter everyday is very
similar to the situation in the PGG: each farmer has the incentive to free-
ride on other farmers during planting or harvesting seasons. However, the
society reaches the most efficient outcome if all farmers exert maximum
effort.
Subjects first played eight periods under the no punishment condition fol-
lowed by eight periods of punishment condition. They knew that there
would be another game after the no punishment condition, but they were
not informed about its content until the no punishment condition was com-
pleted.
In the no punishment condition, subjects are randomly divided into groups
of four and the group composition is fixed throughout the eight periods. In
each period, each subject has an endowment of 20 points and is asked to
decide how many points to contribute to a group account (the remaining
points are allocated to their individual account). The total points in the
group account are multiplied by 1.6 and then evenly distributed among
all group members. In particular, each subject faces the following payoff
function:
ui = (20− ci) + (1.6 ∗
4∑
j=1
cj) / 4
in which ui is i’s payoff, ci is i’s contribution to the group account, and∑4
j=1 cj is the sum of contribution made by all group members.
Note that the contributor only gains 0.4 points for each point contributed
to the group account. Therefore, contributing nothing always gives the
highest material payoff regardless of the contribution of other group mem-
bers. On the other hand, each point contributed to the group’s account
increases the payoff of the whole group by 1.6 points, hence the group level
payoff is highest if all group members contribute 20 points. In the latter
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case, each subject earns 32 points, which is higher than the self interested
outcome which is 20 points.
After all subjects make their decisions, the amount of contribution of each
subject, their earning from the group account, and their total earning in
the current period are shown on their computer screen. The contribution
of each group member is randomly displayed on the computer screen in
each period, therefore, subjects cannot associate contribution with a par-
ticular group member.19 Subjects need to press the ‘CONTINUE’ button
to proceed to the next round.
After the no punishment condition, subjects randomly regrouped and play
eight periods of the punishment condition. The first part of the punish-
ment condition is the same as the no punishment condition: each subject
has an endowment of 20 points and need to decide how many points to
contribute to a group account. After this decision is made, subjects are
informed about their earnings from the first stage and are asked to pro-
ceed to punishment stage, in which subjects can assign punishment tokens
to other group members. In the punishment stage, other group members’
contributions in the present period are displayed on subject’s computer
screen. Based on this information, subjects can assign punishment tokens,
which are restricted between zero and ten inclusive, to other group mem-
bers. Each punishment token costs one point to the punisher and reduces
the earnings of the punished subject by three points.20 Next is the infor-
mation display stage in which subjects’ final earnings are shown. They are
informed about their earnings in the first stage, total punishment tokens
received and total punishment tokens assigned to others in the punish-
ment stage, and their final earnings. Please note that subjects only know
the total punishment tokens received but not who assigned the punishment.
19Other group members’ contribution are displayed because subjects are also asked
to play the PGG with punishment, in which case group members’ contributions must
be revealed. We intend to make the design of the two games as close as possible.
20Subjects are informed that their earning can only be reduced to zero no matter how
many punishment tokens they receive. However, negative earning is possible if ones
earning is reduced to zero due to receiving too many punishment tokens and she also
assigns punishment tokens to others. This design is also used in Herrmann et al. (2008).
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In order to gain a deeper insight of the rice and non-rice difference, we also
asked subjects to participate in a dictator game (DG), an ultimatum game
(UG), and a coordination game (Stag Hunt).
In the dictator game, subjects are randomly assigned to the role of pro-
posers or responders. Proposers have to decide how to divide a total of 60
points between themselves and a randomly matched, anonymous respon-
der. When the task starts, responders are asked to state how many points
they expect to receive. Please note that responders’ answers will not af-
fect the outcome of the dictator game, and the proposers are not informed
about this.21
Subjects’ roles in the ultimatum game are the same as in the dictator game,
but they are randomly regrouped. The difference between the ultimatum
game and the dictator game is that in the former, responders have the
power to reject or accept offers made by proposers. We employed a min-
imal acceptable offer (MAO) method. When proposers are making offers,
responders simultaneously state their minimal acceptable amount. If the
offer made by the proposer is lower than the minimal acceptable amount,
the allocation is automatically rejected, in which case both of them earn
nothing. If the offer is larger or equal to the minimal acceptable amount,
the proposal is automatically accepted, in which case both of them receive
the amount according the division. The subject’s role in the DG and UG
was fixed because this design allows us to investigate whether rice and
non-rice subjects have different levels of strategic consideration. Since the
responder can reject an offer in the UG while she has no influence in the
DG, strategic individuals should offer nothing in the DG and offer a higher
amount in the UG. Therefore, the difference in the offer amount in the UG
and DG is a measure of strategic behavior.
The stag hunt game is a two-player simultaneous move coordination game.
The payoff matrix is presented in table 16. Subjects can choose between
hunting a stag or a hare. Stag is harder to catch but more valuable. Both
21This is accomplished by displaying the information on responders computer screen
after the DG starts.
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players need to choose the same action to make the hunt successful. If
they mis-coordinate, the one who choose stag will fail and hence obtain the
lowest payoff. Hare, on the other hand, is easy to catch and is therefore a
safe choice: it yields a payoff of 22 points regardless of other player’s action.
Table 16: Payoff matrix of the Stag Hunt Game
Subjects’ risk attitudes were elicited using Holt and Laury type lotteries
(Holt and Laury, 2002). They were informed that this task is not incen-
tivized. We chose not to incentivize the risk aversion task in order to
ensure more ballanced payments to the subjects. If this task was incen-
tivized, some subjects would leave the experiment only with the show up
fee. If that happened, there was the risk of students not showing up for our
sessions. In order to avoid that, we opted to incentivize the other tasks,
where we expected better payoffs. We also implemented the triad task,
which is the main dependent variable in Talhelm et al. (2014). The Triad
task is designed to measure people’s thinking styles. The questionnaire
presents subjects with a list of three objects, and subjects are asked to
choose the two items that they think are more related to each other. For
example, one of the questions is panda, banana, and monkey. Panda and
monkey is an analytic choice because they are both animals. On the other
hand, monkey and banana is a holistic choice since monkeys eat bananas.
Since the literature in psychology suggests that collective societies value
group membership, we conducted a priming treatment in half of the ses-
sions. The procedure is simple. In Hebei for example, after all subjects ar-
rived in the lab and were waiting for instructions, the experimenter stated:
please note that all of you are from the Hebei province.22 In the other
sessions, subjects are not informed about this. We find that priming has
22In two sessions in Shandong four subjects stated that they were not from the local
province. In this case, the experimenter explained that they could not participate in the
experiment and were free to leave. Of course, the show-up fee was paid to them.
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no effect on subject’s behavior, we therefore pool the data from priming
and no-priming sessions in the analyses.
13.4 Experimental Procedure
After all subjects arrived in the lab and prior to getting any instructions
about the study, they were asked to sign a formal consent. Participants
knew that each session consists of several parts, but they did not know
the content of the future parts until the corresponding instructions were
provided.
The order of the experimental tasks was organized as follows. First, sub-
jects were asked to fill out a questionnaire, which consisted of the non-
incentivized lottery task and the triad task. Then, they played one shot
DG, UG, Stag Hunt games. After they completed a post experimental
questionnaire, they received their payment and were free to leave. No feed-
back was provided to the subjects regarding the outcome of the DG, UG
and Stag Hunt games until the end of the session. Next, they proceeded
with participating in the PGG no punishment condition, and the PGG
punishment condition, in that order.
The reason we set the order of the games as previously described is that
we wanted to avoid the outcome of one game affecting subject’s behavior
in the subsequent games. The DG, UG and Stag Hunt are the first three
games because we can easily withhold the outcome of these games until
the very end of each session. This is not possible in the PGGs. In the
no punishment condition, the contribution of each group member and each
subject’s earning is shown after each period. In the punishment condition,
the act of punishing or getting punished might influence subject’s behav-
ior, we therefore administered the punishment condition last. In sum, the
order of the games aims to minimize the spillover of each game on subject’s
subsequent behavior.
One of the five games was randomly selected for payment. If the PGGs
were chosen, the experimenter would draw one period out of the eight pe-
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riods. The subjects’ earnings were exchanged to Chinese Yuan at the rate:
1 points = 0.5 Yuan (about 8 US Cents).
The experiments were conducted between Oct 2015 and Jan 2016 in China.
All the tasks are programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). There were
a total of 524 subjects. 116 subjects in Hebei province, 156 subjects in
Shandong province, 128 subjects in Hunan province and 124 subjects in
Zhejiang province. We ran 6 sessions per province. All the sessions were
conducted on Saturdays and Sundays because students’ schedule was busy
during weekdays. Each session lasted about 2 hours. Subjects earned on
average 30 Yuan (about 5 US dollars), including a 15 Yuan show-up fee.
Subjects’ earnings were similar to China’s minimal hourly wage.23
14 Experimental Results
If the tradition of rice farming has resulted in the creation of a more co-
operative social norm and this norm is transmittable from generation to
generation, one should observe that subjects from rice farming provinces
contribute more than subjects from non-rice provinces in the public goods
games. This is exactly what we find. The following result summarizes the
findings in the PGG without punishment.
Result 12 In the PGG without punishment, rice subject’s contribution is
higher than non-rice subject’s contribution. However, the difference is not
observed in the last period.
Support for result 1 is presented in figure 13. Figure 13 illustrates the evo-
lution of average contribution over time. In the no punishment condition
(periods 1 - 8), the average contribution over the eight periods is 10.70
and 9.63 points for rice and non-rice regions respectively. The difference is
marginally significant (Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an indepen-
23See Appendix ?? for the experimental instructions. Please note that the instruc-
tions are in English, as they were used for a pilot session conducted in Royal Holloway,
University of London. Moreover, we abandoned the sliding bar in the DG, UG, and
PGGs for the sessions in China. Input boxes were used instead. The Chinese version is
available upon request.
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dent observation: p = 0.0657).24
Figure 13: Average contribution in each period in PGG and PGG with
Punishment
Notes: The x-axis is the period number and the y-axis is the average contribution. Periods 1-8 are
public goods game without punishment. After period 8, subjects randomly regroup and play another
eight rounds of public goods game with punishment (periods 9-16).
Results from Random Effects Panel Regressions are also consistent with
the non-parametric tests. Columns 1 and 2 show the result for the no pun-
ishment condition. Note that the main variable of interest is Perc. Paddy
Field (Municipality), which is the percentage of cultivated land devoted to
rice paddy field at the municipality level. Perc. Paddy Field (Municipal-
ity) is a finer level of rice statistics than the percentage of rice paddy fields
at the province level. Moreover, for all the regressions in which this finer
level of variable are used, the results are the same if we use the rice dummy
(province level) variable. According to column 1, a ten percentage point in-
crease in the percent of cultivated land devoted to paddy field leads to a 1.2
point increase in contribution. This effect is weakly significant at 10% level.
24We use group level average and conduct statistical tests based on group level to
control for within group dependency. However, the group level average is not exactly
the same as the individual level average due to the fact that some subjects are dropped
from the analysis. Note that the results do not change if we conduct Bootstrapped ttest
on group level clusters.
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The results are the same if we add a set of control variables in column
2. The set of control variables and their descriptions are presented in ta-
ble 17.25
All of our results are robust to controlling for the municipality level GDP
per capita. This is important because differences in economic development
and market integration are strongly associated with the level of coopera-
tion and trust Henrich et al. (2001, 2010). Also note that that a number
of factors are already controlled by design. Nearly all of the subjects are
first year, Han Chinese university students. Therefore, they all speak Man-
darin, have similar education background, share the same cultural origins
(Wen et al., 2004), and live in the same political institutions.26 These
evidence alongside with more robustness check exercises conducted in the
Alternative Explanation section suggest that our findings are not merely a
correlation.
Although the difference in average contribution between rice and non-rice
subjects in the no punishment condition is only marginally significant, the
difference in the pattern of contribution over time is dramatic. Rice and
non-rice subjects start at similar level of contribution in the first period
(Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an independent observation: p =
0.0937). Differences begin to emerge over time. The contribution of non-
rice subjects increases modestly over interaction. In contrast, rice subjects
manage to increase their contributions dramatically. However, rice subjects
25Three subjects are dropped in the regression analyses with control variables. One
subject did not provide their Hukou place at the municipality level so we cannot match
him to the rice statistic. One subject did not state whether he has a Rural or Urban
Hukou. Moreover, these two subjects provided the incorrect student number so we
cannot recover the information using administrative data. Another subject had to leave
early, so she did not answer the social style questionnaire. In order to keep the number
of observation consistent between regressions with and without control variables, we
dropped these three observations in the regressions without control variables. Note that
the results are not affected if we keep these subjects in the regressions without control
variables.
26See Guiso et al. (2006) for a review of the effect of culture on economic outcomes.
Chen (2013) find that the necessity to grammatically distinguish future and present
events leads to present biased time preferences. Bo´ et al. (2010) discover that people
are more cooperative in social dilemma situations under democratic institutions.
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Table 17: Description of Control Variables
Variable Name Description
GDP per capita (Munic-
ipality)
GDP per capita at the municipality level. The latest
data available (2014) from the province level Bureau of
Statistics websites and matched with subject’s Hukou
place.
Holistic Thinking Percentage of holistic choices in the Triad task. The
main dependent variable in Talhelm et al. (2014).
Collectivism & Individu-
alism
In the highly influential work, Hofstede (1980) proposed
the questionnaire in order to compare societies based on
different social styles. The core element of Individualism
is that individuals are independent of each other. On
the other hand, group membership is a central aspect of
collectivism.
Priming (Dummy) A dummy variable equals one if the data comes from the
priming treatment (See the Experimental Design section
for the description of the priming treatment).
From Rural (Dummy) A dummy variable equals one if the subject Has a Rural
Hukou, equals zero otherwise.
Relative Income Relative income assesses subjects income level relative
to their town of residence. There are four levels, “Way
Above”, “Above”, “Same”, “Below”, and “Way Below”.
Risk Attitude The number of risk seeking choices in the non-
incentivized Holt & Laury lottery task.
Single Child (Dummy) A dummy variable equals one if the subject has no sib-
lings, equals zero otherwise.
Natural Science
(Dummy)
According to China’s Education Policy, students in se-
nior high school need to choose between two screams,
the social-science-oriented area, which focuses on his-
tory, politics and geography and the natural-science-
oriented area, which focuses on physics, chemistry and
biology. In the National Higher Education Entrance Ex-
amination, the two streams have separate exam papers.
Please note that students who choose the social-science-
oriented also need to study physics, chemistry and biol-
ogy, but to a lesser degree. This is also true for students
in the natural-science-oriented.
Trustworthy Measures to what extend subjects believe that people
from the local province are trustworthy. Likert scale: 0
”Strongly Disagree” and 10 ”Strongly Agree”.
Public Order (Belief) Measures to what extend subjects believe that people
from the local province obey public order, for example,
do not jump queues, do not spit, and do not shout in
public spaces. Likert scale: 0 ”Strongly Disagree” and
10 ”Strongly Agree”.
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also experience a stronger end game effect, as the contribution unravels to
the same level as non-rice subjects in the last period (Mann-Whitney U
test, each group as an independent observation: p > 0.66).27
The different contribution pattern between rice and non-rice is also con-
firmed in the random effects panel regression showed in column 1 and 2
of table 18. In column 1, both the Period and Period Squared are highly
significant, suggesting that the contribution pattern of non-rice subjects ex-
hibits an inverted-U shape. The interaction terms between the Rice dummy
and the period terms are also significant, which implies that the rice sub-
ject’s contribution pattern has more curvature. The results are the same
if we add a set of control variables (column 2). Moreover, the contribution
pattern between rice and non-rice is similar to the punishment condition
(see columns 3 and 4).
The stronger end game effect of rice subjects compared to non-rice subjects
in the no punishment condition suggests that rice farming does not make
people more cooperative per se, instead, it might be the case that peo-
ple from rice areas understand the public goods situation differently than
non-rice subjects. In other words, they understand that it is profitable to
contribute to the public good so long as there are future interactions.
If it is indeed the case that rice subjects are more familiar with the public
good situation, one should expect the difference in contributions between
rice and non-rice to be more substantial in the punishment condition, since
punishment has proven to be highly effective in fostering cooperation (Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003). Subjects’ behavior in the PGG
with punishment is summarized in result 2.
Result 13 In PGG with punishment, rice subjects’ contribution is signifi-
cantly higher than non-rice subjects’ contribution. The difference is already
significant in the first period and becomes greater towards the end.
27The difference in contribution between rice and non-rice in the PGG without pun-
ishment becomes significant if the last period is excluded because of the strong end game
effect (Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an independent observation: p = 0.0458).
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Table 18: Random Effects Panel Regression about the different contribu-
tion patterns in rice and non-rice provinces
No Punishment Condition Punishment Condition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice -0.279 -0.345 -3.817 -3.956
(0.536) (0.539) (3.463) (3.502)
Period 0.816*** 0.816*** 1.875*** 1.875***
(0.209) (0.210) (0.383) (0.384)
Rice x Period 0.773** 0.773** 0.759 0.759
(0.338) (0.338) (0.602) (0.603)
Period Squared -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.0623*** -0.0623***
(0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Rice x Period Squared -0.0828** -0.0828** -0.0253 -0.0253
(0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0231) (0.0231)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.275 -0.410
(0.411) (0.412)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0316 0.0464
(0.0596) (0.0608)
Priming (Dummy) -0.468 -0.158
(0.542) (0.567)
Holistic Thinking 1.328* 0.311
(0.766) (0.735)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.653* 1.313***
(0.382) (0.392)
Collectivistic 0.488 0.676
(0.443) (0.466)
Individualistic -0.629 -0.431
(0.427) (0.388)
Public Order (Belief) -0.0336 -0.0448
(0.0922) (0.0796)
Trustworthy (Belief) 0.0777 0.123
(0.0897) (0.104)
Male 2.029*** 2.159***
(0.462) (0.369)
Relative Income -0.564** -0.295
(0.279) (0.237)
Risk Attitude 0.0726 0.159
(0.117) (0.106)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.364 -0.0905
(0.478) (0.409)
Constant 8.575*** 8.029*** -1.524 -4.812
(0.351) (2.567) (2.235) (3.410)
Observations 4112 4112 4112 4112
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are from the no punishment condition; columns 3 and 4 are the punishment
condition. Note that there are 4112 observations, which implies 514 subjects are included in the
analysis. As mentioned previously, 7 out of 524 subjects are dropped from the analyses because they
come from a province that the main type of crop is different from the province of experiment. Another
three subjects were dropped because the values of some control variables are missing, as explained in
footnote 14. Clustered Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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The evidence for result 2 is presented in figure 13, in the part that refers
to periods 9-16. The average contribution over the eight periods is 11.90
points for non-rice and 13.40 points for rice; the difference is significant
(Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an independent observation: p =
0.02). Note that the difference in contribution is already significant in the
first period (Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an independent observa-
tion: p = 0.02). In the presence of punishment opportunities, the difference
not only sustains but also enlarges towards the end, which is in stark con-
trast to the no-punishment condition.
Results from Random Effects Panel Regressions are also consistent with
the non-parametric tests. Column 3 shows that a 10% increase in the per-
centage of cultivated land devoted to paddy field is associated with a 1.8
increase in contribution, and this relation is significant at the 5% level.
This finding is robust to the inclusion of control variables (column 2).
One important feature of figure 13 is that for both rice and non-rice sub-
jects, the contribution increases sharply from the no-punishment condition
to the punishment condition. We elaborate on this observation in more
detail in the following.
Result 14 The presence of the punishment mechanism significantly in-
creases the contribution for both rice and non-rice subjects. Moreover,
punishment has a slightly stronger effect for rice subjects.
Non-rice subjects on average contribute 9.63 points in the no punishment
condition. This number increases to 11.87 in the presence of punishment.
The difference, 2.24 points, is highly significant. For rice subjects, the in-
crement is 2.73 and is also highly significant (Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests: p
< 0.01 for both rice and non-rice subjects).28 The results also suggest that
punishment has a stronger effect for rice subjects. The difference in contri-
bution between the no-punishment and punishment condition is larger for
28Since subjects randomly regroup after the no-punishment condition, it is impossible
to conduct paired tests based on the group level. Therefore, these two tests are based
on individual level.
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rice subjects, and it is marginally significant (Mann-Whitney U test: p =
0.0572).
In the following, we investigate subjects’ punishment behavior. We are
interested in how subjects punish each group member instead of the sum
of punishment points assigned to all group members in each period. We
also distinguish between prosocial and anti-social punishment. Prosocial
punishment is defined as assigning punishment points to subjects who con-
tribute less than the punisher. We label this behavior pro-social punish-
ment because the punisher is willing to sacrifice her own payoff to pun-
ish free-riders, and free-riders who receive punishment are more likely to
increase their contribution in following periods (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000;
Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008). Therefore,
pro-social punishment is beneficial to the whole group. Anti-social pun-
ishment is defined as punishing group members that contribute more than
or equal to the punisher. This behavior is labelled anti-social punishment
because the punished subject behaved more pro-socially than the punisher
and this behavior is detrimental to the group’s payoff (Herrmann et al.,
2008).
Distinguishing between pro-social and anti-social punishment is important
because individuals have different punishment behavior towards free-riders
and cooperators (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), and this is a common practice
in the literature.29.
Result 15 Rice subjects engage in significantly more pro-social punish-
ment than non-rice subjects. There is no difference in antisocial punish-
ment.
Evidence for Result 15 is provided in figure 14. Figure 14 depicts the av-
erage punishment points assigned to others as a function of deviation from
the punisher’s contribution. For example, the [-20,-10) category implies
that the punished subject contributes from 10 to 20 points less than the
29See (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Faillo et al.,
2013; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2003)
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punisher. Therefore, all the categories to the left of [0] are pro-social pun-
ishment, and all the other categories are anti-social punishment. The re-
sults confirm that rice subjects assign significantly more punishment points
to free-riders. The difference is significant for categories [-10, -5) and [-5,
0) (Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.01 for [-10,-5) and p = 0.02 for [-5,0))
and is weakly significant for the [-20,-10) category (Mann-Whitney U test:
p = 0.08). If we merge all the three free-riding categories into one cate-
gory, the difference between rice and non-rice becomes highly significant
(Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.01). On the other hand, there is no signifi-
cant difference between rice and non-rice areas in the anti-social categories
(Mann-Whitney U test: p > 0.22 for all relevant categories: [0], (0, 5], (5,
10], and (10, 20]).30
Figure 14: Punishment Behavior
Notes: This figure shows how subjects punish those who contribute less than, more than, or equal
to themselves. The x-axis shows the difference between ones own contribution and one of her group
member’s contribution. For example, [-20, -10) implies one of my group member’s contribution is from
10 to 20 points less than my contribution. The y-axis is the average punishment point subjects assigned
to each category.
The punishment pattern in figure 14 also suggests the necessity to separate
30If we merge all the four positive deviation categories into one category, the difference
between rice and non-rice becomes only weakly significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p =
0.08).
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prosocial and anti-social punishment. As shown in the figure, for pro-social
punishment, the amount of punishment point assigned is positively associ-
ated with the size of free-riding. This association, however, is much weaker
when the punisher contributes more than the punished subject.
The results of tobit regressions regarding subject’s punishment behavior
are congruent with the non-parametric tests.31 Column 1 indicates that a
10% increase in the percentage of cultivated land devoted to paddy field
leads to 1.1 more punishment points assigned to free-riders. Post regres-
sion test suggest that Perc. of Paddy field is not associated with anti-social
punishment (P > 0.27). The results are the same after including the set of
control variables (column 2).
Result 16 Rice subjects are significantly more likely to punish free-riders,
there is no difference in the intensity of punishment conditional on punish-
ing free-riders.
Evidence supporting Result 16 is presented in table 19. Columns 1-3 of
table 19 show that rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders in
comparison to their non-rice counterparts.32 And Columns 4-6 of table 19
shows that conditional on punishing, the intensity of punishment does not
differ between rice and non-rice subjects. Note that the results are the
same if we use the finer level of rice statistics instead of the rice dummy
variable.
In column 1, the Rice dummy coefficient suggest that compared to their
non-rice counterparts, subjects from rice areas are about 7% more likely to
punish free-riders. The effect is weakly significant at the 10% level. The
Anti-Social Punishment variable is significantly negative, but the interac-
tion term between the Rice dummy and Anti-Social Punishment is not
31Note that following Herrmann et al. (2008), we classify anti-social punishment as
the cases in which the punisher’s contribution is strictly less than the punished subject’s
contribution. Therefore, cases when the punisher and the punished subject have the
same contribution are not included in the regression. Results are the same if we include
those observations and treat them as anti-social punishment.
32We use the linear probability model for the ease of presentation. The results are
the same if we use the random effects panel probit model.
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signifiant. This suggests that the likelihood of anti-social punishment is
similar between rice and non-rice subjects.
In Column 2, after we control for the punisher’s contribution, the pun-
ished subject’s contribution, and the other two group member’s average
contribution, the effect becomes significant at 5%. Without these controls,
one cannot claim that Rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders,
instead, it might simply due to the fact that the contribution difference
between the punisher and punished subject is larger in rice areas. For ex-
ample, suppose a punisher contributes 18 points in one period. In the first
scenario, one group member contributes 15 points. In the second scenario,
one group member contributes 8 points. Then the same punisher is more
likely to punish the free-rider in the second scenario, simply because the
difference in contribution is larger. To show that rice subjects are more
likely to punish free-riders than non-rice subjects, we need to control for
the punisher and punished subject’s contribution. The reason to include
the other two group member’s average contribution is similar. The results
are the same if we add the set of control variables (column 3).
Columns 4-6 of table 19 show that conditional on punishing, the intensity
of punishment does not differ between rice and non-rice subjects.33 This is
true for both anti-social punishment and pro-social punishment. In column
4, the variable Rice is not significant, suggesting that conditional on pun-
ishing free-riders, the amount of punishment points assigned to free-riders
does not differ between rice and non-rice. The interaction term between
Rice and Anti-Social Punishment is also not significant. This implies that
there is no difference in the intensity of anti-social punishment conditional
on performing an anti-social punishment. The results are the same if we
control for the contribution level of other group members as well as other
control variables (columns 5 and 6).
Result 17 The percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice farming also
33We used the tobit model to analyze punishment points assigned to other groups
members because the amount of punishment is restricted between zero and ten inclusive.
Note that the results are the same if we use linear models.
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Table 19: Regressions Regarding the Probability of Punishment and the
Intensity of Punishment Conditional on Punishing
Probabiliy of Punish Intensity of Punishment Conditional on Punishing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rice 0.0704* 0.0926** 0.0864** 0.453 0.431 0.308
(0.0410) (0.0402) (0.0387) (0.278) (0.266) (0.241)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.138*** -0.0810*** -0.0807*** -0.139 0.327 0.257
(0.0148) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.164) (0.251) (0.250)
Rice X Anti-Social Punishment -0.0163 -0.00946 -0.00933 0.00559 0.0542 0.236
(0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.342) (0.353) (0.333)
Punisher Contribution 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 0.0595 0.0392
(0.00306) (0.00307) (0.0368) (0.0311)
Punished Contribution -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0376** -0.0399**
(0.00199) (0.00199) (0.0190) (0.0170)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.0187*** -0.0186*** -0.0246 -0.0305
(0.00307) (0.00308) (0.0292) (0.0258)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.000171 0.00276
(0.00457) (0.0275)
Holistic Thinking -0.150** 0.299
(0.0661) (0.411)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.000112 0.299
(0.0339) (0.197)
Relative Income 0.00231 0.135
(0.0207) (0.141)
Risk Attitude 0.0103 0.141*
(0.00788) (0.0775)
Male 0.0183 0.687***
(0.0282) (0.243)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.00252 0.222
(0.0259) (0.169)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0819** -0.127
(0.0357) (0.215)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.0161 -0.137
(0.0319) (0.247)
Collectivistic 0.000413 0.0702
(0.0338) (0.254)
Individualistic 0.0632* 0.396*
(0.0349) (0.216)
Trustworthy (Belief) -0.00920 0.0222
(0.00810) (0.0590)
Public Order (Belief) 0.00160 0.0195
(0.00608) (0.0507)
Period -0.0233 0.0198 0.0206 0.103 0.148 0.0197
(0.0458) (0.0454) (0.0453) (0.293) (0.289) (0.283)
Period Squared 0.000555 -0.000961 -0.000985 -0.00600 -0.00758 -0.00204
(0.00182) (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0112)
Constant 0.554** 0.445 0.323 1.736 1.220 -1.090
(0.278) (0.277) (0.308) (1.811) (1.807) (2.146)
sigma
Constant 1.865*** 1.853*** 1.754***
(0.168) (0.168) (0.137)
Observations 7519 7519 7519 2379 2379 2379
Notes: Columns 1-3 are Random Effects Linear Probability models and the dependent variable is
the probability of punishing Free-rider and Cooperators. Columns 4-6 are tobit regressions and the
dependent variable is the amount of punishment points assigned to other group member who contributed
more or less than the punisher. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
89
predicts pro-social punishment within rice regions; there is no such rela-
tionship within non-rice regions.
The evidence supporting result 17 is presented in table 20. Columns 1 and
2 shows that among rice farming regions, a 10% increase in the percent-
age of cultivated land devoted to paddy fields is associated with about 0.7
additional punishment points assigned to free-riders, and this relation is
significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, there is no such relation-
ship among non-rice regions (columns 3 and 4).We did not find a positive
relationship between the Percentage of paddy field and the level of con-
tribution even among rice regions. Our interpretation of these findings is
twofold. First, we believe this result to show that the level of contribu-
tion is influenced by a province wide norm. Second, the fact that subjects
from rural areas in rice provinces punish more is indicative of the channel
through which the norm operates. It stands to reason that those subjects
will have more strongly ingrained the mechanism that brings about the
norm and that is indeed manifested in their behavior in our games.
Result 18 There is no difference between rice and non-rice in how subjects
respond to punishment.
Table 21 demonstrates the results on how subjects respond to prosocial
punishment (columns 1-2) and anti-social punishment (columns 3-4). The
dependent variable is the change in contribution from period t to t+1 con-
ditional on receiving punishment points in period t. The variable Punish
Receive is the total number of punishment points received in period t. Also
note that the definition of prosocial and anti-social punishment is slightly
different from previous analyses. Here, prosocial punishment implies that
the punished subject contributed less than the other group member’s av-
erage contribution. Anti-social punishment is defined analogously. This
adjustment is crucial because it is impossible to separate the effect of each
punisher’s punishment points assigned to the punished subject.
Results in column 1 indicate that subjects significantly increase their contri-
bution after receiving pro-social punishment. In particular, they contribute
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Table 20: Tobit regressions regarding the relationship between the per-
centage of paddy fields and punishment behavior within rice and non-rice
regions
Rice Regions Non Rice Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perc. Paddy Field (Municipality) 0.0691** 0.0625** -0.0182 -0.0173
(0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0265) (0.0227)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.591 -0.197 -1.381*** -0.941***
(3.854) (3.219) (0.232) (0.258)
Perc Rice Paddy X Anti-Social Punishment -0.0167 -0.0122 0.0170 0.00216
(0.0468) (0.0410) (0.0347) (0.0319)
Punisher Contribution 0.0517 0.0619
(0.0648) (0.0495)
Punished Contribution -0.0659** -0.0299
(0.0308) (0.0250)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.119** -0.0778**
(0.0601) (0.0355)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) 0.00657 -0.0784
(0.0684) (0.0578)
Holistic Thinking -1.247 -1.417**
(0.841) (0.615)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.167 0.151
(0.387) (0.353)
Relative Income 0.375 0.0240
(0.279) (0.292)
Risk Attitude -0.0464 0.213*
(0.144) (0.121)
Male 1.023* -0.212
(0.536) (0.279)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.0197 -0.174
(0.330) (0.374)
Priming (Dummy) 0.314 0.878**
(0.573) (0.400)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.541 0.0116
(0.555) (0.366)
Collectivistic 0.456 -0.110
(0.520) (0.506)
Individualistic 0.257 0.868**
(0.513) (0.435)
Trustworthy (Belief) -0.110 0.0408
(0.112) (0.108)
Public Order (Belief) 0.0689 -0.0807
(0.0926) (0.0808)
Period -0.688 -0.378 0.151 0.273
(0.708) (0.705) (0.544) (0.520)
Period Squared 0.0234 0.0123 -0.0128 -0.0170
(0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0223) (0.0212)
Constant -1.483 -3.893 -0.915 -3.338
(4.524) (5.051) (3.215) (3.493)
Observations 3534 3534 3985 3985
Notes: The table shows how does percentage of paddy field predict punishment behavior within rice
and non-rice regions. Columns 1-3 are data from rice regions and columns 4-6 are data from rice
regions. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
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0.675 more points for each pro-social punishment point received. The in-
teraction term “Punish Receive × Rice” is not significant, suggesting that
there is no difference between rice and non-rice subjects in how they react
to pro-social punishment. The result for antisocial punishment is shown in
column 3. The “Punishment Received” is now significantly negative, which
implies that subjects decrease their contribution after receiving antisocial
punishment. The interaction term “Punish Receive × Rice” is not signifi-
cant, which means rice and non-rice subjects also behave similarly in their
response to anti-social punishment.
15 Alternative Explanations
15.1 Rice farming and Social Preferences
We have shown that rice subjects contribute more than non-rice subjects
in the PGGs, and rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders. One
possible explanation is that individuals from rice and non-rice regions de-
velop different social preferences. For example, rice subjects might be less
tolerant towards inequality (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). Since free-riders earn more than cooperators in the PGGs, inequality
aversion can explain why rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders.
Another possible explanation is that rice subjects might put more weight
on social welfare or efficiency concerns (Charness and Rabin, 2002). In our
experimental setting, each contribution increases the total earning of the
group by three points, while not contributing will only increase total welfare
by one point. Therefore, rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders
because pro-social punishment has shown to be one of the most effective
ways to foster cooperation (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003).
Moreover, since punishing cooperators is detrimental to contribution (Her-
rmann et al., 2008), this might also explain why rice subjects are not more
likely to conduct anti-social punishment. Lastly, rice and non-rice might
differ in the level of their reciprocity concerns (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006;
Rabin, 1993).
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Table 21: Random Effects Panel Regression on how subjects respond to
punishment
Pro-Social Punishment Anti-Social Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Punish Receive 0.675*** 0.663*** -0.362*** -0.375***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.137) (0.138)
Punish Rec. X Rice 0.0287 0.0439 0.294 0.302
(0.172) (0.170) (0.211) (0.205)
Rice 0.0744 -0.0285 -0.125 -0.0678
(0.290) (0.291) (0.164) (0.166)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.00270 -0.0139
(0.0254) (0.0207)
Holistic Thinking 0.353 0.636**
(0.412) (0.263)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.0236 0.0450
(0.249) (0.152)
Relative Income -0.236* 0.0966
(0.125) (0.119)
Risk Attitude -0.00918 -0.0220
(0.0499) (0.0588)
Male 0.493** -0.0912
(0.223) (0.139)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.488*** 0.166
(0.179) (0.144)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0355 -0.00209
(0.190) (0.164)
Single Child (Dummy) 0.524** -0.120
(0.230) (0.144)
Collectivistic -0.0131 0.0478
(0.177) (0.185)
Individualistic -0.0853 -0.169
(0.208) (0.156)
Trustworthy (Belief) 0.0192 0.0805
(0.0412) (0.0531)
Public Order (Belief) -0.000724 -0.00852
(0.0398) (0.0479)
Period -0.951** -0.907** 0.0393 0.0631
(0.467) (0.459) (0.480) (0.484)
Period Squared 0.0371* 0.0353* -0.00672 -0.00779
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0207) (0.0208)
Constant 6.730** 6.296** 0.0443 -0.813
(2.705) (3.058) (2.731) (3.059)
Observations 1461 1461 1465 1465
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in contribution from t to t+1 conditional on receiving
punishment points in period t. Punish receive is the total number of punishment points received in
period t. Columns 1 and 2 investigates cases in which the punished subject contributes less than
other group member’s average contribution (response to prosocial punishment). Columns 3 and 4
investigates cases in which the punished subject contributes more than other group member’s average
contribution (response to anti-social punishment). Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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In this subsection, using data from the dictator game, ultimatum game,
stag hunt game, PGGs, as well as questionnaire measures, we show that
our results are less likely to be driven by these alternative explanations.
This evidence alongside with the findings articulated in the Results sec-
tion provide further support for the case suggesting that rice cultivation
does not modify people’s cooperative preferences per se, instead, it teaches
people the effectiveness of punishment in fostering cooperation in social
dilemma situations.34
Results from the dictator game and ultimatum game, which are presented
in figure 15, suggest that pure altruism and inequality aversion is not the
main difference between rice and non-rice subjects. Panel (a) and panel
(c) of figure 15 present the distribution of offers in the dictator game and
ultimatum game respectively. The distribution between rice and non-rice
is very similar (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p > 0.95 for dictator game and
ultimatum game). Responder’s behavior in the two games is presented
in panel (b) and (d). There is also no significant difference between rice
and non-rice subjects (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p > 0.66 for the dictator
game and ultimatum game).
When measuring people’s reciprocity concerns, beliefs about other’s behav-
ior play an important role. We did not elicit subjects’ beliefs or ask subjects
to make a contingent contribution plan based on other group member’s con-
tribution as in Fischbacher et al. (2001). This is because we employed a
repeated PGG and each session already lasts about 2 hours. Nevertheless,
in the following, we present four pieces of evidence showing that the differ-
ence in beliefs is not an important factor in explaining the results.
First, if rice and non-rice subjects hold different beliefs, we should observe
that rice’s contribution is different to non-rice in the very first period of the
PGG. We have already shown in the previous section that the difference
is very weak. Moreover, the difference in the second period is also small
34It is not our intention to test for which social preferences model best fits the behavior
of our subjects. Instead, we merely wish to point out that rice and non-rice subjects do
not differ in these preferences, and hence the difference in behavior between them are
mediated via different channels.
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Figure 15: Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game
(a) Proposal in the DG (b) Expected to Receive in DG
(c) Proposal in the UG (d) Responder Behavior in the UG
Notes: In the DG, while proposers were making decisions, responders were asked to specify the amount
they expected to receive from the proposer. Responders knew that this would not affect the outcome of
the dictator game and the proposers were not informed about this procedure. In the UG, responder’s
minimal acceptable offer was elicited. Before knowing the actual offers made by proposers, responders
were asked to specify a number, which is the Minimal acceptable offer. If the proposer’s offer is higher
than or equal to this number, the offer is automatically accepted. Otherwise, the offer is automatically
rejected.
(Mann whitney U test, each group as an independent observation: p =
0.07). Second, in the dictator game, we ask the responders the amount
they expect to receive from the dictators. Since responder’s expectation
has no influence on dictator’s behavior (recall that dictators do not know
this procedure) as well as the outcome of the game, this essentially mea-
sures responder’s belief on dictator’s social preference. Responder’s beliefs
are similar between rice and non-rice regions. Third, in the post experi-
mental questionnaire, we asked subjects to what extend they believe that
people from the local province obey public order, for example, do not jump
queues, do not spit, and do not shout in public areas (10 points scale, 1
= completely disobey, 10 = completely obey). The average score in rice
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and non-rice regions is not significantly different from each other (Mann
whitney U test: p > 0.21). Last but not least, the proportion of the effi-
cient choice in the stag hunt game is very similar between rice and non-rice
subjects (Two-sample test of proportions: no-rice = 72.7%; rice = 72.4%; p
> 0.94). Note that ‘hare’ in the stage hunt game is a risk dominant action,
which means if one is sufficiently uncertain of the other player’s strategy,
the expected payoff of selecting ‘hare’ is higher. On the other hand, ‘stag’
is the best response if one believes that the other player also choose the
efficient action. Since both rice and non-rice subjects coordinate so well on
the efficient outcome, it is reasonable to attribute this to the fact that they
hold similar beliefs regarding the level of cooperativeness of other partici-
pants.
Reciprocity concerns also incorporate cases in which subjects reciprocate
on final outcomes. Relating to the PGGs, subjects might contribute more
if other group members contributed more in the previous periods. To test
whether rice and non-rice subjects differ in this regard, we conduct the
following exercises.
Following Croson (2007), we regress subject’s contribution in period t on
other group member’s Min, Median, and Max contribution in the same
period. This analysis is able to investigate subjects’ reciprocity concerns
because Croson (2007) find that subjects’ beliefs about the amount other
group members would contribute in the next period in the PGG is quite
accurate.35
The results are shown in table 22. They illustrate that there is no difference
in the level of reciprocity between rice and non-rice subjects. Columns 1
and 2 show the results for the no punishment condition. The other group
member’s Min, Median, and Max are all positively signifiant. However,
none of the interaction terms is signifiant at any conventional levels. This
is also true in the punishment condition (columns 3 and 4). These results
35Since we did not elicit subjects’ beliefs, we cannot be sure that subjects in our sample
can make accurate inference about others’ behavior. Therefore, we also regress subject’s
contribution in period t on other group member’s Min, Median, and Max contribution
in the previous period (t− 1). The results are the same.
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alongside with the finding that rice and non-rice subjects hold similar beliefs
suggest that different levels of reciprocity concerns cannot account for the
behavioral differences in the PGGs between rice and non-rice subjects.
Table 22: Random Effects Panel Regressions about reciprocity in the PGGs
No Punishmet Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice 0.412 0.224 0.509 0.149
(0.775) (0.769) (0.921) (0.884)
Other Median 0.260*** 0.258*** 0.426*** 0.418***
(0.0694) (0.0668) (0.0657) (0.0655)
Rice x Other Median -0.0909 -0.0943 -0.0684 -0.0645
(0.0902) (0.0879) (0.0844) (0.0834)
Other Max 0.0737* 0.0662 0.00964 0.000837
(0.0443) (0.0436) (0.0515) (0.0504)
Rice x Other Max 0.0536 0.0603 0.0707 0.0791
(0.0646) (0.0638) (0.0701) (0.0685)
Other Min 0.0766* 0.0690* 0.113** 0.108**
(0.0432) (0.0414) (0.0440) (0.0453)
Rice x Other Min 0.0587 0.0648 0.00403 0.00961
(0.0643) (0.0621) (0.0551) (0.0553)
Period 0.666*** 0.679*** 0.722*** 0.744***
(0.114) (0.115) (0.195) (0.201)
Period square -0.0809*** -0.0825*** -0.0234*** -0.0241***
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.00726) (0.00750)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.186 -0.210
(0.373) (0.290)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0251 0.0170
(0.0439) (0.0367)
Priming (Dummy) -0.273 -0.119
(0.315) (0.258)
Holistic Thinking 0.871 0.233
(0.626) (0.528)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.528* 0.871***
(0.312) (0.262)
Collectivistic 0.336 0.333
(0.398) (0.326)
Individualistic -0.483 -0.282
(0.374) (0.305)
Public Order (Belief) 0.00581 -0.0144
(0.0765) (0.0577)
Trustworthy (Belief) 0.0397 0.0269
(0.0763) (0.0785)
Male 1.616*** 1.633***
(0.392) (0.262)
Relative Income -0.396 -0.351*
(0.255) (0.190)
Risk Attitude 0.0684 0.0799
(0.0893) (0.0730)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.108 0.159
(0.409) (0.261)
Constant 4.768*** 4.462* 0.270 -0.808
(0.551) (2.353) (1.467) (2.481)
Observations 4112 4112 4112 4112
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution in the PGGs. Other Max is the maximum of other group
members contribution in the current period. Other Median and Min are defined analogously. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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15.2 Self selection into rice and non-rice regions
Our main findings might also be driven by sorting. In particular, if a family
does not like the social norm of a rice region, they can move to a non-rice
province, or vice versa. We address this issue by further excluding observa-
tions whose father’s birth place was born in a rice province but themselves
have Hukou from a non-rice province or vise versa. Differently put, we drop
subjects who have probably migrated into or out of rice farming regions.
This strategy can control for the self selection issue because prior to 1990,
the Chinese government was enforcing laws that restricted immigration
and travel within China.36 Also note that China has had strict immigra-
tion controls since the Qin Dynasty (221 to 206 BC). This is because people
are a scare resource. Both women and men are needed to tend the farm-
ing lands and men are required to form armies (See Jinguang (2004) for
the documentation of the policy in Qin Dynasty; see the Book of Han for
immigration policy in Han Dynasty; See the Tang Code for the policy in
Tang Dynasty; See the Collected Regulations of the Great Ming for the
policy in Ming Dynasty.)
We did not ask subjects for their father’s age, but it is reasonable to assume
that their fathers were born before the time when the immigration law was
lifted.37 Consequently, the birth place of the subject’s father was not due
to selection, and subjects who still have the same Hukou as their father’s
should be free from selection issues. 8 subjects are dropped, and the results
are not affected from excluding them.
15.3 Differences other than Rice Cultivation
The rice and non-rice provinces in our sample differ in other aspects besides
the type of cultivation. Therefore, our finding might be a manifestation of
the other differences instead of the difference in rice farming. In this sub-
section, we discuss several possible alternative explanations in detail and
36See Qian (2008) and the references therein for the details about the policy.
37The normal age for the first year undergraduate student is 18 years old. Therefore,
their parents were born before the lift of the immigration law as long as they had their
children after they were 8 years old.
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show that our results are less likely driven by other factors.
First of all, please note that a number of factors are already controlled
by design. Nearly all of the subjects are first year, Han Chinese univer-
sity students. Therefore, they all speak Mandarin, have similar education
background, share the same cultural origins (Wen et al., 2004), and live in
the same political institutions.38 Moreover, we also controlled for a set of
variables including municipality level GDP per capita, which suggest that
our results are not driven by the difference in economic development and
market integration (Henrich et al., 2001, 2010).
Secondly, if our results are driven by other cross province unobservable fac-
tors, we should observe differences between the two rice farming provinces
as well as differences between the two non-rice farming provinces. The re-
sults in table 23 and table 24 suggest this is not the case. The results show
that subjects from the two rice provinces behave similarly in the PGGs.
This is also true for subjects from the two non-rice provinces.
At the very least, we believe it is very unlikely that the factors that con-
found rice cultivation are only able to affect the behavior of our subjects
in the PGGs but not in other measures, such as behavior in DG, UG, Stag
Hunt, as well as the answers in the Triad task and Social styles question-
naires.
16 Complementary Evidence
In order to demonstrate the external validity of our experimental results
we provide here evidence from two unrelated surveys and a natural field
experiment. In the following we describe the measures we used and present
evidence that is consistent with our interpretation of the experimental re-
sults.
38See Guiso et al. (2006) for a review of the effect of culture on economic outcomes.
Chen (2013) find that the necessity to grammatically distinguish between future and
present events leads to more present biased time preferences. Bo´ et al. (2010) discover
that people are more cooperative in social dilemma situations under democratic insti-
tutions.
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Table 23: Random Effects Panel Regressions Comparing contribution in
the PGG with punishment between the two rice provinces and the two
non-rice provinces.
Non-Rice Provinces Rice Provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shandong -1.114 -0.534
(0.890) (0.781)
Zhejiang 0.531 0.319
(0.902) (0.989)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) 0.115 -0.0543
(0.0736) (0.0911)
Holistic Thinking 0.283 0.373
(0.804) (1.164)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.278 -0.609
(0.710) (0.526)
Relative Income -0.533* 0.187
(0.279) (0.364)
Risk Attitude 0.0525 0.261*
(0.159) (0.148)
Male 2.142*** 1.947***
(0.575) (0.460)
Natural Science (Dummy) 1.771*** 0.604
(0.513) (0.557)
Priming (Dummy) -0.533 0.286
(0.738) (0.858)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.172 0.311
(0.623) (0.570)
Collectivistic 0.941 0.187
(0.625) (0.673)
Individualistic -0.0409 -0.611
(0.557) (0.546)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.208 -0.00377
(0.133) (0.148)
Public Order (Belef) -0.143 0.0928
(0.105) (0.117)
period 1.875*** 2.633***
(0.386) (0.468)
period × period -0.0623*** -0.0876***
(0.0144) (0.0183)
Constant 12.49*** -6.757 13.16*** -6.853*
(0.729) (4.661) (0.645) (3.929)
Observations 2112 2112 2000 2000
Notes: the dependent variable is the contribution in the PGG with punishment. The results are the
same for the no punishment condition. We did not include it because the difference is weak between
rice and non-rice. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 24: Tobit Regressions Comparing punishment behavior between the
two rice provinces and the two non-rice provinces.
Non-Rice Provinces Rice Provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shandong -0.163 0.278
(0.408) (0.382)
Zhejiang 0.167 -0.146
(0.634) (0.731)
Anti-Social Punishment -1.471*** -1.312*** -1.918*** -1.743***
(0.315) (0.257) (0.458) (0.450)
Shandong x Anti-Social Punishment 0.246 0.0129
(0.457) (0.402)
Zhejiang x Anti-Social Punishment 0.0114 0.0829
(0.601) (0.549)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0902 0.0108
(0.0565) (0.0686)
Holistic Thinking -1.430** -1.516*
(0.646) (0.853)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.107 0.218
(0.362) (0.392)
Relative Income -0.0714 0.357
(0.298) (0.264)
Risk Attitude 0.227* -0.0524
(0.123) (0.143)
Male -0.128 1.040**
(0.275) (0.507)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.173 0.0946
(0.351) (0.380)
Priming (Dummy) 0.923** 0.155
(0.410) (0.588)
Single Child (Dummy) 0.0293 -0.563
(0.382) (0.515)
Collectivistic -0.0617 0.360
(0.517) (0.489)
Individualistic 0.811* 0.150
(0.429) (0.520)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.0252 -0.130
(0.102) (0.113)
Public Order (Belef) -0.0802 0.0761
(0.0773) (0.0979)
period 0.157 0.163 -0.741 -0.757
(0.542) (0.510) (0.722) (0.707)
period × period -0.0132 -0.0132 0.0255 0.0264
(0.0222) (0.0209) (0.0284) (0.0278)
Constant -0.901 -2.811 4.339 3.376
(3.179) (3.469) (4.484) (4.890)
Observations 3985 3985 3534 3534
Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of punishment points assigned to free-riders or cooperators.
Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
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16.1 A natural field experiment
Wikipedia is a global encyclopedia that relies on voluntary contributors to
write its entries and provide content that anyone can enjoy. As such it is a
prime example of a public good39. Despite some initial issues with blocked
access from the Chinese authorities, Wikipedia has been largely accessible
to mainland China since 200840. In addition, according to data provided
by Wikipedia, its simplified Chinese edition ranks in the bottom 10 of ed-
its made by automated content editors (bots)41. Finally, Zhang and Zhu
(2011) found that a temporary block on Wikipedia in mainland China in
2005 lead to a statistically significant reduction in contributions, indicating
the existence of a community of Wikipedia users who reside in mainland
China. Combining the aforementioned results with our current findings
we hypothesise that users from rice areas are more likely to contribute to
Wikipedia articles. Since the encyclopedia does not provide any data to
identify the location of its contributors and IP addresses may not be very
reliable given the availability of VPN workarounds in mainland China, we
focus our attention to contributions made to the pages of cities. Contrib-
utors need to have both knowledge of the topic to the page of which they
contribute and an interest in improving its presentation on Wikipedia. We
assume that people who possess both qualities in sufficient levels to con-
tribute to the pages of Chinese cities are more likely to hail from those
areas, therefore offering us an indirect way to control for location. We used
Wikipedia’s own list of Chinese cities42 to download data on the number of
edits and the total size in bytes of the pages of those cities in the version
of Wikipedia in simplified Chinese. Our sample contains 206 cities from
mainland China. Of those cities 195 are eligible for our purposes, as they
do not belong to regions with big minority populations. Table 25 presents
the descriptive statistics of the sample of eligible cities. The variables of
39We were inspired to look into Wikipedia as a natural field experiment of a public
good by Georganas and Li (2010)
40For more information see the documentation on Wikipedia itself: https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship of Wikipedia#China
41For more information see: https://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/Sitemap.htm
42For a complete list of cities see: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%
E8%8F%AF%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E5%85%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9C%8B%
E5%9F%8E%E5%B8%82%E4%BA%BA%E5%8F%A3%E6%8E%92%E5%90%8D.
Data accessed in March 2017.
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interest are the Page size (in bytes) and the Total number of edits. The
former is a measure of the intensive and the latter of the extensive margin
of contributions to the public good. We use the population of the urban
area of the city, the GDP per capita of the province in 2005 and the growth
of the per capita GDP between 2005 and 2015 as additional controls. The
inclusion of the GDP per capita from other years does not affect our re-
sults and in the interest of space we do not include these measures in our
presentation. We use the binary measure for the classification of cities into
rice and non-rice.
Table 25: Descriptive statistics of the Wikipedia sample
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Non-rice Provinces
Population (Urban area) 83 1,935,605.000 2,526,350.000 328,555 19,295,000
Page size (bytes) 83 34,062.450 36,605.520 24 211,385
Total number of edits 83 472.060 716.669 1 4,752
GDP2005 83 16,142.880 5,622.360 7,477 45,444
g2005 2015 83 2.293 0.485 1.343 3.811
Rice Provinces
Population (Urban area) 112 2,251,961.000 2,829,462.000 155,540 22,265,426
Page size (bytes) 112 40,381.000 40,536.060 2,155 181,363
Total number of edits 112 595.929 763.794 40 4,794
GDP2005 112 18,004.040 8,489.157 5,052 51,474
g2005 2015 112 2.632 0.651 1.016 4.908
Result 19 The pages of cities in rice provinces have more edits than cities
from non-rice provinces, demonstrating a difference in the extensive margin
of contribution to the public good.
Support for this result is provided in table 26. Since the number of edits
is a discrete and non-negative variable we use Poisson and Negative Bi-
nomial regressions used in the analysis of count data. The Rice dummy
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both the Poisson
and the Negative Binomial regression (columns (2) and (3)). Column (1)
also presents the results from an OLS regression where we applied a loga-
rithmic transformation due to the discreteness of the dependent variable.
Columns (4)-(6) show that the same results hold if we restrict the sample
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to cities in the four provinces from our experiment. This shows both that
our provinces are typical, in that respect, of rice and non-rice provinces
and that our results extend beyond the lab.
Result 20 The pages of cities in rice provinces have more bytes than cities
from non-rice provinces, demonstrating a difference in the intensive margin
of contribution to the public good.
Support for this result is provided in table 27. For reasons similar to the
ones about the edits we use Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions.
The Rice dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in
both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial regression (columns (2) and
(3)). Column (1) also presents the results from an OLS regression where we
applied a logarithmic transformation on the dependent variable. The rice
variable is positive but not significant in this specification (p-value=0.12).
Columns (4)-(6) show that the same results hold if we restrict the sample
to cities in the four provinces from our experiment. Again this result is
important for the external validity of our experimental findings both with
respect to other provinces and within the provinces where we ran the ex-
periment.
16.2 Volunteering
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a major survey in the social sciences
investigating the attitudes of people all over the world. We used responses
from the sixth wave of the survey, which was administered in 2012 in China
and between 2010 and 2014 worldwide, to construct a measure of the vol-
unteering propensity of responders in rice and non-rice regions. We chose
the sixth wave of the survey because it has a large sample (N=2300), rel-
atively evenly ballanced between rice and non-rice regions (1238 and 1062
responses respectively). Volunteering is akin to contributing to a public
good; the volunteer is unlikely to be compensated for the time supplied
unless a sufficiently large number of volunteers exists that she may find
herself on the receiving end of others contributions. We hypothesise that
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Table 26: Regressions about the total number of edits on the pages of cities
in China on the Chinese Wikipedia
Full sample Experimental provinces
log(Edits) Edits log(Edits) Edits
OLS Poisson Negative OLS Poisson Negative
binomial binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rice 0.297∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.007) (0.101) (0.315) (0.018) (0.212)
GDP2005 −0.00001 −0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.0001 −0.00003∗∗∗ −0.00004
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00000) (0.00002)
g2005 2015 −0.126 0.047∗∗∗ −0.170 −0.573 −0.099∗∗∗ −0.344
(0.127) (0.007) (0.107) (0.442) (0.028) (0.298)
Population (log) 0.957∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.004) (0.062) (0.226) (0.011) (0.152)
Constant −7.465∗∗∗ −8.484∗∗∗ −6.448∗∗∗ −7.012∗∗ −9.492∗∗∗ −6.135∗∗∗
(1.040) (0.055) (0.877) (3.329) (0.178) (2.243)
Observations 195 195 195 52 52 52
Notes: standard errors are reported in brackets. Because of the nature of count data the dependent
variable was log transformed for the OLS regressions. Results from truncated Poisson and Negative
binomial regressions are similar and available upon request. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 27: Regressions about the size (in bytes) of pages of cities in China
on the Chinese Wikipedia
Full sample Experimental provinces
log(Bytes) Bytes log(Bytes) Bytes
OLS Poisson Negative OLS Poisson Negative
binomial binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rice 0.222 0.110∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.975∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.001) (0.115) (0.380) (0.002) (0.246)
GDP2005 −0.00003∗∗ −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ −0.00003∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00000) (0.00003)
g2005 2015 −0.183 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.203∗ −0.538 0.059∗∗∗ −0.242
(0.150) (0.001) (0.122) (0.534) (0.003) (0.346)
Population (log) 0.754∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.0005) (0.071) (0.273) (0.001) (0.177)
Constant 0.228 0.443∗∗∗ 0.995 −2.650 −6.217∗∗∗ −2.707
(1.231) (0.007) (0.999) (4.016) (0.019) (2.601)
Observations 195 195 195 52 52 52
Notes: standard errors are reported in brackets. Because of the nature of count data the dependent
variable was log transformed for the OLS regressions. Results from truncated Poisson and Negative
binomial regressions are similar and available upon request. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01105
people living in rice areas volunteer more. The WVS contains questions
that allow us to test this hypothesis. More precisely, people were asked
whether they are members (active or inactive) of eleven types of organiza-
tions, ranging from sport or recreational organizations, self help groups and
environmental organizations to political parties, labor unions and profes-
sional associations.43. Using the answers to these questions we contructed
two variables: the first is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the respon-
der volunteers in at least one organization and zero otherwise. The second
variable is equal to the sum of organizations to which the responder volun-
teers. In the same vein as our analyses above, the binary variable measures
the extensive margin and the count variable measures the intensive margin
of volunteering.
Descriptive statistics regarding the two variables are presented in table 28.
Our control variables include the sex of the responder, age, education, the
class and the income category to which she declared she belonged, whether
her household saved money during the previous year, the number of chil-
dren she has, her satisfaction with her financial condition, whether she lives
in a city with a population greater than half a million and the GDP per
capita of the province in 2011, the year before the survey was conducted.
Due to reasons concerning privacy and anonymity we can only identify the
province of the responders.
Result 21 Respondents from rice provinces are more likely to volunteer.
The evidence for this result is presented in columns (1) and (2) of table 29.
Both the OLS and the logit regression show a strong (p<0.01) and positive
relationship between the rice dummy and the probability of a respondent
volunteering. We interpret this finding to mean that respondents from rice
provinces show a difference in the extensive margin of volunteering.
Result 22 Respondents from rice provinces volunteer to more organiza-
tions. However, this result is robust to different specifications only at the
43We used the answers in variables V25 to V35 in the sixth wave of the World Values
Survey
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Table 28: Descriptive statistics of variables in WVS
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Non-rice Provinces
Volunteering Binary 1,062 0.218 0.413 0 1
Volunteering Count 1,062 0.459 1.273 0 11
Sex (Female=1) 1,062 0.524 0.500 0 1
Age 1,062 44.756 14.931 18 75
Education 1,062 5.111 2.196 1 9
Subjective Class 1,008 3.739 0.860 1 5
Subjective Income 924 4.378 2.001 1 10
Saved Money 985 1.734 0.822 1 4
Number of Children 1,062 1.443 1.025 0 7
Financial Satisfaction 1,059 6.475 2.028 1 10
CityPop>.5M 1,062 7.716 0.451 7 8
GDP 2011 1,062 38,419.410 13,881.250 19,595 81,658
Rice Provinces
Volunteering Binary 1,238 0.281 0.450 0 1
Volunteering Count 1,238 0.587 1.319 0 11
Sex (Female=1) 1,238 0.498 0.500 0 1
Age 1,238 43.200 14.928 18 75
Education 1,238 5.532 2.488 1 9
Subjective Class 1,184 3.623 0.833 1 5
Subjective Income 1,131 4.447 1.723 1 9
Saved Money 1,171 1.679 0.801 1 4
Number of Children 1,238 1.463 1.096 0 7
Financial Satisfaction 1,186 5.985 1.947 1 10
CityPop>.5M 1,238 7.775 0.418 7 8
GDP 2011 1,238 41,013.540 17,991.950 16,413 82,560
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10% level.
The evidence for this result is presented in columns (3) to (5) of table 29.
Since we are dealing with count data we used the Poisson regression and
also ran a Negative binomial and a Quasi-Poisson specification to correct
for potential overdispersion. According to the Poisson regression the rice
dummy is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, when we ran
the alternative specifications it became significant only at the 10% level,
suggesting that the relationship is not extremely robust.
16.3 A local public good
Finally, we utilized the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), a large and
nationally representative longitudinal survey of Chinese communities to
provide evidence regarding the external validity of our experimental results.
We used data of the CFPS from the 2010 and 2014 waves. Interviewers
collecting data for CFPS visit the residences of the respondents. At the
end of the questionnaire the interviewers are asked to grade the tidiness
of the street of the interviees. The tidiness of the street is, arguably, a
public good. The neighbors who take care not to litter the street and help
maintain its tidiness volunteer their time and effort but they will only re-
ceive a reward at least equal to their contribution only if others contribute
as well. Our dependent variable is the rating of the interviewers. Due to
privacy concerns, we cannot identify the interviewer and we only have data
aggregated at the province level. Our independent variables are the per-
centage of rice paddy fields in the province, the economic condition of the
respondent, the number of households interviewed in the neighborhood, in-
formation on the architectural layout of the residence (house, appartment,
etc) and three dummy variables about whether the interviewee live in an
urban area, lives in a minority region and the wave of the survey.
Result 23 The streets of respondents in rice areas are tidier.
The evidence for this result is presented in columns (1) and (2) of table
30. The coefficient of the percentage of rice paddy fields cultivated in the
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Table 29: Regressions regarding volunteering
Volunteering Binary Volunteering Count
OLS logistic Poisson Negative Quasi-Poisson
binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rice 0.055∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.206∗ 0.220∗
(0.020) (0.115) (0.069) (0.117) (0.113)
Sex 0.052∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.179 0.183∗
(Female=1) (0.020) (0.112) (0.066) (0.113) (0.108)
Age 0.003∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.007
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Education 0.030∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.029) (0.018) (0.030) (0.029)
Subjective Class −0.022 −0.126 −0.032 −0.047 −0.032
(0.015) (0.089) (0.053) (0.091) (0.088)
Subjective Income 0.031∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.042) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
Saved Money 0.017 0.103 0.161∗∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.161∗∗
(0.013) (0.077) (0.044) (0.077) (0.072)
Number of Children −0.032∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗ −0.170∗∗
(0.012) (0.070) (0.045) (0.074) (0.074)
Financial Satisfaction −0.004 −0.021 0.015 0.019 0.015
(0.006) (0.032) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033)
CityPop>.5M 0.054∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.137) (0.086) (0.141) (0.141)
GDP 2011 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.515∗∗ −5.741∗∗∗ −6.492∗∗∗ −5.647∗∗∗ −6.492∗∗∗
(0.205) (1.224) (0.765) (1.264) (1.259)
Observations 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873
Notes: standard errors are reported in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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province remains positive and statistically significant (p<0.05) even when
controls are included. We interpret this as an indication that those living
in rice provinces enjoy a local public good of higher quality. This is only
possible if the contributions are also higher.
16.4 Discussion of complementary evidence
In this section we have provided evidence from three different sources re-
garding the external validity of our experimental results. The first piece of
evidence concerns a natural field experiment about a global public good.
We showed that the contributions to that public good were significantly
higher in rice regions both on the intensive and the extensive margin.
Wikipedia articles are a local public good, since everyone has potentially
access to them. We believe that the use of data regarding the pages of
cities is a good way to circumvent the problem of the widespread use of
VPN services that render the use of the IP addresses of the anonymous
editors potentially meaningless. Nevertheless, we must admit that in the
ideal situation we would have much more personalised information. In or-
der to address that concern, we turned to the WVS data. We believe that
we have convincingly shown that volunteering in China, both on the inten-
sive and the extensive margin, is higher in rice provinces. Finally, our last
piece of evidence concerns the state of a public good: the tidiness of the
streets of a neighborhood. Again, our results show that the streets in rice
provinces are more tidy. Our results are show that whether we measure the
inputs to a public good, as in our two pieces of evidence, or as an output,
as in the last one, we find results that are fully consistent with the ones in
our experiment. We believe that these findings, taken as a whole, provide
strong support for the external validity of the experimental results.
17 Conclusion
This paper explores the origins of cultural differences in the level of coop-
erativeness. In particular, we show that the centuries old practice of rice
farming in China leads to a cooperative social norm. This norm is intergen-
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Table 30: Regressions regarding street tidiness
Street tidiness
OLS
(1) (2)
Perc. of Paddy Field 0.787*** 0.187**
(0.158) (0.082)
Economic Condition 0.483***
(0.030)
No. Households 0.00002
(0.00002)
Minority Region (Dummy) -0.375***
(0.108)
Urban Area (Dummy) 0.097
(0.059)
Architecture Layout 0.372***
(0.030)
2014 Wave (Dummy) -0.048
(0.052)
Constant 4.412*** 0.739***
(0.079) (0.101)
Observations 1254 1242
Notes: standard errors are reported in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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erationally transmittable. We go one step further from similar studies by
providing evidence that the norm operates through the attitudes regarding
punishment. To test the hypothesis, we travelled to four typical rice and
non-rice farming provinces in China and recruited local university students
who had no to minimal farming experience as subjects. We find that com-
pared to subjects from non-rice regions, subjects from rice areas contribute
more in both the no-punishment and punishment conditions of the pub-
lic goods game. Rice subjects are also more likely to punish free-riders.
Importantly, we did not find any differences between rice and non-rice
subjects in games that do not involve cooperation, such as the DG, UG,
and Stag Hunt game. Additionaly, we found no differences in the intensity
of punishment conditional on punishing between rice and non-rice subjects.
The results suggest that the cultivation of rice does not affect preferences
for cooperation. Instead, it is more consistent with our findings that people
in rice areas understand the public goods situation differently than their
non-rice counterparts. There are three pieces of evidence supporting our
conjecture.
First, the contributions of rice and non-rice subjects in the last round of
the PGG without punishment are virtually identical. This is important be-
cause the strategic incentives to free ride are known to be strongest in the
last round of a repeated game. Genuinely more cooperative subjects would
contribute more in the last round, ignoring those incentives. Yet, what we
observe is that their contributions do not differ. Second, the contributions
of rice and non-rice subjects in the first round of the PGG without pun-
ishment are also very close and not statistically different from each other.
In the first round, when nothing is known about the other group members,
contributions are based on expectations. The fact that both subjects made
very similar choices shows that their expectations do not differ44. Third, we
measured social preferences and expectations regarding social preferences
using standard dictator and ultimatum games. We find no differences in
44This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that there are no differences within
rice and non-rice subjects in the priming and no-priming conditions, where we empha-
sized the origins of the other participants.
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those games. In addition to analyzing the experimental data we provide
evidence from two surveys and a natural field experiment which show that
the contributions of people in rice provinces are higher and the state of
a local public good is improved. These results are consistent with our ex-
perimental findings and show that they are likely to be valid beyond the lab.
Furthermore, we show that subjects from rice areas are more likely to
punish free-riders in the PGG’s with punishment. However, there are no
differences in the intensity of punishment conditional on punishing. We
believe this shows a different attitude towards punishment. The reason
that people from rice farming areas are more willing punish is probably
the fact that punishment is both easier to enforce and more crucial in a
rice farming environment. First, since rice farming requires a large amount
of labour, each farmer benefits from successful cooperation. This feature
ensures that free-riding is socially undesirable in rice farming societies. Sec-
ond, the paddy fields are usually plain lands without any shelter, therefore,
each farmer’s effort is easily observable. Third, the cost of avoiding punish-
ment or choosing the “outside option” is extremely high for farmers, since
they will loose their farming land if they migrate to another area. Last but
not least, the names of the free-riders might spread relatively fast within
the village, since rural villages are usually small and closed communities.
These characteristics are in line with Debraj’s summarization of the broad
conditions that need to be satisfied for punishment to occur. The condi-
tions are: positive individual gain from successful cooperation, member’s
action must be observable by others, and sanctions must be enforceable
(Ray, 1998).
There are a number of open questions that are interesting for future re-
search. For example, how is this norm affected by migration that brings in
contact people from various backgrounds who carry different norms? Has
the recent urbanization of China become a melting pot for norms and which
ones dominate? Are market forces, through trade liberalization and indus-
trialization, or homogenization efforts mandated by the state, such as the
common curriculum in universities able to influence those norms and how?
More broadly, to what other differences does this norm might lead? Do
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people from rice and non-rice areas have different forms of social network?
Do they behave differently in network games? Hsee and Weber (1999) find
that Americans are more risk averse than Chinese and they proposed the
“Cushion Hypothesis” arguing this is because they have different social
networks – Chinese are more likely to receive help under financial pressure,
therefore, they can afford to be more risk seeking. It would be interesting
to see whether rice and non-rice subjects have different risk attitudes.
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Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome to the study!
If you have a question at any point, please raise your hand and wait for one of us to come
over. We ask that you turn off your mobile phone and any other electronic devices. Commu-
nication of any kind with other participants is not allowed.
Today we will do two studies. The instructions for the first study are attached. The in-
structions for the second study will be provided upon completion of the first study. Please
read these instructions carefully; in addition to the show up fee of £4, the cash payment
you will receive at the end of the study depends on your and the other participants’ decisions.
So it is important that you read the instructions carefully. Your payment is calculated as follows:
Your payment = £4 (show-up fee) + earnings from 1st study + earnings from 2nd study
In the following we speak of points that you can earn. The points will be translated into
money for you according to the following exchange rate:
100 points = 40 pence.
1
The First Study
Summary
In every round the computer will choose a winning colour. This will be either green or yellow.
In every round you will also be allocated into groups of 3. Your task will be to guess, as a
group, which is the winning colour. You only earn points if your group’s guess matches
the winning colour. In every round you will also be assigned a green and a yellow value. If
your group’s guess matches the winning colour those values are used to determine how many
point you will earn in that round.
Your group decides via majority rule. Before picking one option you can buy a hint re-
garding the winning colour. The accuracy of the hint is 80%. That is the hint will match the
winning colour 4 out of 5 times. 1 out of 5 times the hint will not match the winning colour.
The cost of the hint is 10 points.
Your earnings at the end of each round are as follows:
• If your group’s guess and the winning colour are both green: earnings per round = green
value - cost for hint (0 or 10 points)
• If your group’s guess and the winning colour are both yellow: earnings per round = yellow
value - cost for hint (0 or 10 points)
• If your group’s guess and the winning colour differ: earnings per round = - cost for hint
(0 or 10 points)
Winning Colour
At the beginning of each round the computer will randomly choose one of the two colours,
yellow or green, to be the winning colour. Both colours have a 50-50 chance of being the
winning colour.
Yellow and Green Value
At the beginning of every round you will also be assigned two values: a yellow value and a
green value. Your values are two numbers between 0 and 100. Each number between 0
and 100 has an equal chance of being chosen. Just like you, the other members of your group
are randomly assigned a green and a yellow value. Their values need not be the same as
yours. You will not be informed at any point about the exact green and yellow values of the
other group members. Your values and the other members’ values are not in any way related
to the computer’s choice.
The yellow value is used to determine the amount of points you will earn if your group’s
guess and the winning colour are both yellow. The green value is used to determine the amount
of points you will earn if your group’s guess and the winning colour are both green.
Your Picks
In every round you will be asked to make a guess as a group. Each member of the group will
be asked to pick one out of three options; pick yellow, pick green and pick Blank. Blank picks
are neutral and do not count in favour of either colour. You will not be informed at
2
any point which option the other group members picked.
The group guess will be determined using a simple majority rule: The colour (green or
yellow) that was picked by the most members of the group will be the choice of
your group. In case of a tie, the computer will flip a coin to determine your group’s guess.
The Hint
Before making your pick and after learning your green and yellow value for that round you will
have the opportunity to buy a hint. In order to get the hint you will have to pay 10 points. If
you buy the hint you will be shown a statement indicating which is the winning colour in that
round. The accuracy of the hint is 80%. That is the hint will match the winning
colour 4 out of 5 times. 1 out of 5 times the hint will not match the winning colour.
The hint is personal. That is you are the only one who knows your hint. The other members
of your group will also have the opportunity to buy a hint. However you will not know at any
point whether they did buy a hint and what that was.
Number of Rounds and Groups
There will be 30 rounds in this study. At the beginning of each round you will be allocated
to a group of 3. In addition to yourself that group consists of 1 more human player and one
preprogrammed player. After each round you will be allocated to a new group. The other
human player in this new group need not be the same as the one in the previous round.
You will not know who the other participants in your group are at any point.
In each round you will only deal with decisions in your group.
The Preprogrammed Player
Every time you play there is one preprogrammed player in your group. The preprogrammed
player never buys a hint. In each round, she picks either yellow or green with equal
probability. That is, in each round there is a 50% chance that she picks yellow and a 50%
chance that she picks green. The preprogrammed player’s pick does not affect the
round’s winning colour nor does the winning colour affect the preprogrammed
player’s choice.
Example 1
Your yellow value is 70. Your green value is 40. Your group’s guess is yellow. The winning
colour is yellow. Your pick was blank and you did not buy the hint. Your earnings in this
round are:
yellow value - cost for hint = 70 - 0 = 70 points
Example 2
Your yellow value is 70. Your green value is 40. Your group’s guess is green. The winning
colour is yellow. Your pick was green and you bought the hint that cost you 10 points. Your
earnings in this round are:
3
No match - cost for hint = 0 - 10 = -10 points
Example 3
Your yellow value is 70. Your green value is 40. Your group’s guess is yellow. The winning
colour is yellow. Your pick was yellow and you bought the hint that cost you 10 points. Your
earnings in this round are:
yellow value - cost for hint = 70 - 10 = 60 points
Example 4
Your yellow value is 5. Your green value is 40. Your group’s guess is yellow. The winning
colour is yellow. Your pick was yellow and you bought the hint that cost you 10 points. Your
earnings in this round are:
yellow value - cost for hint = 5 - 10 = -5 points
4
Details of the Procedure
Stage 1
In the picture below you can see a screenshot from stage 1. On the left side of the screen your
green and yellow value for that round are displayed.
On the right side of the screen you can buy the hint. It costs 10 points and its accuracy
is 80%. You can buy the hint by clicking on YES. If you don’t want to buy the hint you can
click on NO. Please decide carefully. Once you click on a button you cannot change
your decision.
5
Stage 2
In the picture below you can see a screenshot from stage 2. On the left side of the screen you
are informed about your green and yellow value minus the cost you paid for the hint in stage 1.
On the top right corner in the orange box you can see the hint, if you bought one, and its
accuracy. The hint is a message saying:
yellow is the winning colour
or
green is the winning colour
On the middle right of the screen there are your three options: green, blank and yellow.
You can pick one by clicking on the corresponding box. Be advised: Once you click on a
button you cannot change your pick.
6
Stage 3
In the picture below you can see a screenshot from stage 3. On the top of this screen you are
reminded of your yellow and green value in this round as well as the cost you paid for the hint.
On the middle you are reminded of what was the suggestion of your hint, if you bought one,
and what was your pick. You are also told what was the guess of your group and the winning
colour.
On the bottom of your screen you are told how may points you earned in this round.
7
Control Questions
1
Your yellow value is 60. Your green value is 30. What is the yellow value of the other human
player in your group?
1. 60
2. 30
3. A number between 0 and 100
4. 0
2
Your yellow value is 60. Your green value is 30. You did not buy the hint. What is the winning
colour?
1. Yellow
2. Green
3. Either Yellow or Green with a 50-50 chance
3
Your yellow value is 58. Your green value is 45. Assume that you picked yellow, the other hu-
man player picked blank and the winning colour is green. What option did the preprogrammed
player pick?
1. Yellow
2. Green
3. Either Yellow or Green
4
Your yellow value is 60. Your green value is 30. You bought the hint and paid 10 points. You
picked green and your group’s guess is yellow. The winning colour is yellow. How many points
did you earn in this round?
Answer:
5
Your yellow value is 20. Your green value is 90. You bought the hint and paid 10 points. You
picked green and your group’s guess is green. The winning colour is yellow. How many points
did you earn in this round?
Answer:
8
6Your yellow value is 36. Your green value is 44. You did not buy the hint. You picked Blank
and your group’s guess is green. The winning colour is green. How many points did you earn
in this round?
Answer:
7
Your yellow value is 65. Your green value is 39. You bought the hint and paid 10 points. You
picked Blank and your group’s guess is yellow. The winning colour is green. How many points
did you earn in this round?
Answer:
8
Your yellow value is 73. Your green value is 39. You did not buy the hint. You picked green
and your group’s guess is green. The winning colour is green. How many points did you earn
in this round?
Answer:
9
Instructions for Second Study
The second study is very similar to the first study.
The only change is that the preprogrammed player will always pick yellow.
Everything else remains the same as in the previous rounds.
Again: 100 points = 40 pence.
Control Question
1
Your yellow value is 60. Your green value is 45. You bought the hint and paid 10 points.
Assume that you picked yellow, the other human player picked green and the winning colour
is green.
What option did the preprogrammed player pick?
Answer:
What is your group’s guess?
Answer:
What are your earnings in this round?
Answer:
10
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Thank	you	for	participating.		
Please note that communication with other participants is prohibited during the 
study. If you have a question once the study has begun, please raise your hand 
and an assistant will come to your desk to answer it. Violation of this rule can lead 
to immediate exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
Today we will do 5 studies. The instructions for the first study are attached. Once 
a study is completed, you will receive instructions for the next study. 
During the study we will not speak in terms of GBP, but in points. Your entire 
earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the study the total amount of 
points you have earned will be converted to RMB at the following rate: 
1 point = 0.4 GBP 
At the end of today’s study, one out of 5 study will be randomly selected for 
payment. After you completed all the studies, a card will be drawn from a bag, 
containing cards numbered from 1 to 5. The number on the card determines 
which study is for payment. 
You will receive GBP 4 as a show-up fee for participating. Therefore, your total 
earning is: 
Total Earning = Show-up fee + money you earned in the randomly chosen study 
Please read the instructions carefully, because your earnings in each study 
depends on how well you understand the instructions. 
Instructions for the First Study 
In this study, first you will be assigned a role. You will be either a Proposer or a 
Responder. If you are a Proposer, you will be randomly and anonymously paired 
with a Responder. If you are a Responder, you will be randomly and anonymously 
paired with a Proposer. This way, half of the people in the room will be Proposers 
and half of them will be Responders. 
DECISION OF PROPOSER 
The Proposer’s role is to allocate a total of 60 points between the Proposer and 
Responder. The input screen for the Proposer is presented below: 
The Proposer needs to use the slider to allocate points between him or her and 
the Responder. The more points the Proposer allocates to the Responder the less 
points he or she keeps. The amount of points allocated to the Responder as well 
as the points remaining for the Proposer are both shown on the screen. 
DECISION OF RESPONDER 
In the current study the responder can only accept the allocation made by the 
Proposer. In other words, the allocation made by the Proposer is implemented 
regardless of whether the Responder agrees or disagrees. 
 
 
EARNINGS 
The Proposer and the Responder receive the amount according to the allocation 
made by the Proposer. 
 
 
Control questions 
1. Suppose the Proposer allocated 20 points to the responder. 
What are the earnings for the Proposer?........ 
What are the earnings for the Responder?........ 
What can the Responder do if he/she is not satisfied with the allocation? ………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Suppose the Proposer allocated 40 points to the responder. 
What is the earnings for the Proposer?........ 
What is the earnings for the Responder?........ 
What can the Responder do if he/she is not satisfied with the allocation? ………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Instructions for the Second Study 
This study is very similar to the previous one.  
Your role in this study remains the same as in the previous study. If you were a 
Proposer, you will also be a Proposer in this one. If you were a Responder, you will 
also be a Responder in this one. 
Again . If you are a Proposer, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with 
a Responder. If you are a Responder, you will be randomly and anonymously 
paired with a Proposer. This way, half of the people in the room will be Proposers 
and half of them will be Responders. Your pair in this study need not be the same 
as in the previous study. 
DECISION OF PROPOSER 
The decision of the Proposer is exactly the same as in the previous study. The 
Proposer needs to allocate a total of 60 points between the Proposer and the 
Responder. In this study, the Responder can accept or reject the offer. 
NEW IN STUDY 2: DECISION OF RESPONDER 
Responders need to enter the minimum acceptance amount while the Proposers 
are making their decisions. The minimum acceptance amount is a number such 
that if the Proposer allocates a number less than the minimum acceptance 
amount, the allocation will be automatically rejected. On the other hand, if the 
Proposer allocates a number more or equal to the minimum acceptance 
amount, the allocation will be automatically accepted. For example, if a 
Responder stated 20 as the minimum acceptance amount and the Proposer 
allocates 19 or less to the Responder, then the allocation is automatically 
rejected. If the Proposer allocates 20 or more points to the Responder, then the 
allocation is automatically accepted. Important, Responders and Proposers are 
making decisions simultaneously. Therefore, Proposers will NOT know Responders’ 
minimum acceptance amount while making the allocation. Similarly, Responders 
will NOT know Proposers’ allocation while entering minimum acceptance 
amount. 
While Proposers are making decisions, Responders need to enter a number 
between 0 and 60. This number is called the “Minimum Acceptance Amount.” If 
the points that Proposer allocated to Responder are less than this “Minimum 
Acceptance Amount”, Proposer’s allocation will be automatically rejected. On 
the other hand, if the points that Proposer allocated to Responder are more or 
equal to this “Minimum Acceptance Amount”, Proposer’s allocation will be 
automatically accepted. For example, if a Responder stated 20 as the minimum 
acceptance amount and the Proposer allocates 19 or less to the Responder, then 
the allocation is automatically rejected. If the Proposer allocates 20 or more points 
to the Responder, then the allocation is automatically accepted. Important, 
Responders and Proposers are making decisions simultaneously. Therefore, 
Proposers will NOT know Responders’ minimum acceptance amount while 
making the allocation. Similarly, Responders will NOT know Proposers’ allocation 
while entering minimum acceptance amount. 
 
The input screen for the Responder is presented below. 
EARNINGS 
If the allocation made by Proposer is accepted, both receives the points 
allocated to them. 
If the allocation made by Proposer is rejected, both receive zero points. 
 
Please answer the questions in the next page. They serve as a test for you 
understanding of the task. 
 
Control questions 
1. Suppose the Proposer allocated 20 points to the Responder. 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 15, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 45, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
2. Suppose the Proposer allocated 40 points to the responder. 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 15, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 45, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
	
Instructions for the Third Study 
In this study, participants are randomly divided into groups of two. You will 
therefore be in a group with another participant.  
DECISIONS 
You and the other participant in your group need to pick one out of two possible 
choices simultaneously. The choices are labelled @ and #. When you make your 
choice you will not know what the other participant will choose. The other 
participant will not know your choice either. In other words, no participant will 
know what action the other player chose when making a decision. 
EARNINGS 
The following table shows earning for all possible combination of choices made 
by you and the other participant in your group. 
 
	 	 Other's	Choice	
	 	 @	 #	
Your	
Choice	
@	 (30, 30) (10, 22) 
#	 (22, 10) (22, 22) 
 
Note that, the numbers that are Bolded in each cell are earnings for you. The 
other number in each cell indicates the earning for the other participant. 
For example, suppose your choice is “@” and the other’s choice is “#”, then the 
earning are (10, 22). Therefore, you earn 10 points and the other participant earns 
22 points. If you choose “#” and the other's choice is “#”, then the earning are 
(22, 22). Therefore, you earn 22 points and the other participant earns 22 points 
too. 
Keep in mind: You and the other participant make your choices simultaneously 
without knowing what the other participant chooses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control questions: 
1. Suppose you choose @ and the other participant choose @. 
What is the earning for you?...... 
What is the earning for the other participant?...... 
 
2. Will you know what the other participant chose when you chose? …. 
Will the other participant know what you chose once he or she choses? … 
 
3. Suppose you earn 22 and the other participant earn 10. 
What was your choice?...... 
What was the other participant's choice?...... 
 
Instructions for the Fourth Study 
In this study, participants are randomly divided into groups of four. You will 
therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. You will remain in the same 
group for the duration of this study. There will be a total of 6 periods, each 
participant will face the same decision in each period. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 20 points. We call this 
your endowment. In each period you will be asked to decide how many points 
of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group Account. You may allocate 
any integer number of points between 0 and 20. The remainder of your 
endowment will be automatically allocated to your Individual Account. The input 
screen is presented below: 
You can use the slide bar to decide how many points of your endowment you 
want to allocate to the Group Account. The amount allocated to your Private 
Account is also shown on the screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
EARNINGS 
After all the participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period 
are calculated. Your earnings consist of two parts: 
Your earnings from the Individual Account equal the points that you keep for 
yourself, and are thus independent of others’ decisions. For every point you keep 
for yourself in your Individual Account, you earn 1 point. 
Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total number of points 
allocated to the Group Account by the 4 group members (including yourself). This 
total amount is multiplied by 1.6 and then distributed equally amongst the four 
group members – each member receives a quarter of it (25%). In other words, 
each point that you allocate to the Group Account turns into 1.6 points, which 
are distributed equally to four members i.e. 0.4 points each. 
 
So, for each point that you or any of your group members allocate to the Group 
Account, you and the other three group members receive 0.4 points each. 
In summary, your earnings in each period are calculated as follows: 
Example: Suppose in one period that you allocated 8 points to the Group 
Account and that the other three members of your group allocated a total of 22 
points. This makes a total of 30 points in the Group Account. In this case each 
member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×30 = 12 
points. In addition, you also receive 12 points from your Individual Account. 
Therefore, your earning in this period is: (20 – 8) + 0.4 x 30 = 24 points. 
 
 
 
(1) Your earnings from the Individual Account. 
 
(2) Your earnings from the Group Account. 
   Your earnings =  
 
   Earnings from Individual Account + Earnings from the Group Account =  
 
   20 - (Your allocation to the Group account) + 0.4 x (Total points allocated 
to Group Account by all group members) 
RESULTS SCREEN 
After all your group members have made their decision, your allocation and the 
sum of all allocations in your group are reported on the Result Screen as shown 
below. To aid you in your calculation, your earnings from your individual account 
and your earnings from the group account are both presented on the screen. 
Please press the Continue button after you have read all the information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SCREEN 
Next the information screen appears, which reveals the contributions of the 
other group members. 
This screen shows how many points each group member allocated to the Group 
Account. Your allocation is displayed in the first column, while the allocations 
made by the other group members are shown in the remaining three columns. 
Please note that the order in which other group member’s allocations are 
displayed changes randomly in every period. The allocation in the second 
column, for example, generally represents a different group member each time. 
The same holds true for the allocations in the other columns. That way you are 
informed about the contributions but not about the identities of the other group 
members. 
A new period will start shortly after pressing the Continue button. You will again 
receive 20 points as endowment and you will be asked again to decide how 
many points of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group Account. 
If this study is randomly chosen for payment, we will randomly pick 1 period out 
of the 6 periods and your payments will be calculated by your decisions in that 
period 
Please answer the questions in the next page. They serve as a test for your 
understanding of the task.
Control questions 
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Suppose nobody 
(including you) contributes any points to the Group Account. What is: 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Other group members earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Other group members earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Other group members total earnings?........... 
 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Suppose you contribute 
8 points to the Group Account. All other group members each contribute 12 
points to the Group Account. What are: 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Other group members earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Other group members earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Other group members total earnings?........... 
 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Suppose the other three 
group members contribute a total of 30 points to the Group Account. 
 
a) If you contribute 5 points to the Group Account. 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Other group members earnings from the Group Account?........... 
 
 
b) What are your earning if you contribute 15 points to the Group Account? 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Instructions for the Fifth (Last) Study 
 
This study is similar to the previous study. First you will be randomly divided into a 
new group of four. The new group composition will not change throughout this 
study. 
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 10 Points at the beginning of 
this study. This one-off payment can be used to pay for eventual losses during this 
study. However, you can always evade losses with certainty through your own 
decisions.  
This study consists of 10 periods and there are 2 stages in each period. The first 
stage is identical to the previous study. At the beginning of each period each 
participant receives 20 points as his or her endowment. You need to decide how 
many points of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group Account (and 
hence the remainder of your endowment will be automatically allocated to your 
Individual Account). Your earnings from the first stage will be calculated exactly 
in the same way as in the previous part. 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 
There will be a new second stage introduced after all participants have made 
their decisions in the first stage. 
At the second stage you can observe how many points each group member 
allocated to the Group Account. In addition, in this stage you can decrease the 
earning of each group member by assigning deduction tokens to him/her. If you 
do not want to decrease the other’s earning, you simply do not assign any 
deduction tokens to him/her. Note that other group members can also decrease 
your earnings if they wish to do so. 
The input screen for the second stage is presented below: 
 
 
   Your earnings from the First Stage =  
 
   Earnings from Individual Account + Earnings from the Group Account =  
 
   20 - (Your allocation to the Group account) + 0.4 x (Total points allocated 
to Group Account by all group members) 
 The screen shows how many points each group member allocated to the Group 
Account at the first stage. Your allocation is displayed in the first column, while the 
allocations made by the others are shown in the remaining three columns. Please 
note that the order in which allocations are displayed changes randomly in every 
period. The allocation in the second column, for example, generally represents a 
different group member each time. The same holds true for the other columns. 
This way you are informed about the contributions but not about the identities of 
the other group members. 
You now have to decide whether, and if so how many, deduction tokens to assign 
to each of the other three group members. If you do not wish to change the 
income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. If you want to 
distribute deduction tokens, you must put a negative sign in front of the number 
(without spaces between them). 
You can assign between 0 and 10 deduction tokens to each group member. 
However, each deduction token costs you 1 point. Therefore, the larger the 
amount of deduction tokens that you assign to other group members, the larger 
your costs. The total cost of assigning deduction tokens is calculated as follows: 
 You can move from one input field to the other using the mouse. 
Example: If you assign 2 deduction tokens to one member (enter -2), assign 8 
deduction tokens to another member (enter -8), and you assign 0 deduction 
token to the last group member (enter 0), the sum of assigned deduction tokens 
is 2 + 9 + 0 = 11 and the total cost is 11 x 1 = 11 points. 
Each deduction token assigned to a participant reduces his/her earnings by 3 
points. A participant’s total received deduction tokens equal the sum of 
deduction tokens other group members assigned to him/her. Consequently, the 
amount of earnings decreased by the received deduction tokens is calculated 
as follows: 
Important: By receiving deduction tokens, each participant’s earning can only be 
reduced to ZERO. 
Example: If a participant received 2 deduction token from one group member, 9 
deduction tokens from another group member, and 0 deduction token from the 
last group member, then the participant received a total of 2 + 9 + 0 = 11 
deduction tokens. Consequently, his/her earnings will be decreased by 11 * 3 = 
33 points. If this participant earned 40 points in the First Stage, then his/her earnings 
will be 40 – 33 = 7 points. If this participant earned less than 33 in the First Stage, 
his/her earning will only be reduced to 0 point. It is possible that one can earn a 
negative amount: if your earnings were reduced to ZERO by receiving deduction 
tokens and you distributed 5 deduction tokens to others, your final earnings will be 
0 – 5 = -5 points. However, you can always evade losses with certainty through 
your own decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
   Total amount of earnings decreased by received deduction tokens = Sum 
of received deduction tokens x 3 
   Total cost of assigning deduction tokens = Sum of assigned deduction 
tokens x 1 
EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions in the second stage, your earnings 
for the period are calculated.  
The earnings from the First Stage are the same as in the previous part. These are 
the earnings from your Individual Account and the earnings from the Group 
Account. 
The earnings from the Second Stage depend on the total deduction tokens you 
assigned to other group members as well as the total deduction tokens you 
received from other group members. 
In sum, your earnings in each period are calculated as follows: 
Please remember that your earnings at the end of the second stage can be 
negative, if the cost of your points used to distribute deduction tokens exceeds 
your (possibly reduced) income from the first stage. You can however avoid such 
losses with certainty through your own decisions! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your earnings at the end of the second stage  = income per period 
 
=  Earnings in the First stage 
 － (Sum of deduction tokens received from other participants x 3) 
－ (Sum of deduction tokens assigned to other participants) 
 
RESULTS SCREEN 
At the end of the second stage, your allocation and the sum of all allocations in 
your group are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. The sum of 
deduction tokens you assigned to others as well as the sum of deduction tokens 
you received are also presented on the screen. 
 
Please press the Continue button after you have read all the information. A new 
period will start shortly. 
If this study is randomly chosen for payment, we will randomly pick 1 period out of 
the 10 periods and your payments will be calculated by your decisions in that 
period 
Please answer the questions in the next page. They serve as a test for you 
understanding of the task.
Control questions 
1. Suppose at the second stage you assign the following deduction tokens to your 
three other group members: -9, -5, and 0. What is  the total cost of your assigned 
deduction tokens?........... 
 
2. What is your cost if you assign a total of 0 points?........... 
 
3. Suppose you earn 10 points in the First stage. By how many points will your 
income from the first stage be reduced if you receive a total of 1 deduction 
tokens from the other group members?........... 
 
4. Suppose you earn 20 points in the First stage. By how many points will your 
income from the first stage be reduced if you receive a total of 5 deduction 
tokens from the other group members?........... 
 
5. Suppose you earn 30 points in the First stage. If you received 1 deduction token 
and assigned a total of 5 deduction tokens. What are your final 
earnings?.................. 
 
6. Suppose you earn 20 points in the First stage. If you received 7 deduction tokens 
and assigned a total of 5 deduction tokens. What are your final 
earnings?.................. 
 
7. Suppose you earn 10 points in the First stage. If you received 2 deduction tokens 
and assigned a total of 8 deduction tokens. What are your final 
earnings?.................. 
 
